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Abstract
We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate members’ ordinal preferences –
that is, how they interpret “the will of the people.” In an experiment, we elicit revealed attitudes
toward ordinal preference aggregation and classify subjects according to the rules they appar-
ently deploy. Majoritarianism is rare. Instead, people employ rules that place greater weight on
compromise options. The classification’s fit is excellent, and clustering analysis reveals that it
does not omit important rules. We ask whether rules are stable across domains, whether people
impute cardinal utility from ordinal ranks, and whether attitudes toward aggregation differ across
countries with divergent traditions.
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1 Introduction
Envision a benevolent party (the planner) who must make a decision that impacts the members of
some group, and who possesses accurate information about the group members’ preferences. The
foundational question of social welfare asks, how should the planner determine what is best for the
group? Potential answers to this question have been the subject of enduring debate since at least the
late 18th century, when Marie Jean Antoine Nicholas Caritat, better known as Marquis de Condorcet,
and Jean-Charles de Borda proposed the competing aggregation criteria that still bear their names
(Borda, 1781; Condorcet, 1785). Condorcet advocated selecting an option that majority-defeats all
alternatives. Borda insisted that the best rule would instead make use of all the information contained
in each individual’s ranking of the options. His proposal amounts to selecting the alternative for which
the sum of the assigned ranks is smallest.
Potential answers to the social welfare question necessarily depend on the types of information
concerning preferences the planner deems meaningful. In particular, most of modern economic theory
treats utility as identified only up to an individual-specific monotonic transformation, which precludes
cardinal interpersonal comparisons.1 Arrow’s canonical formulation of the social welfare problem (Ar-
row, 1950) therefore assumes that the planner can only use ordinal information concerning prefer-
ences.2 Invoking the aggregation axiom known as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) also
effectively precludes the use of information on ranks.3 The logic of IIA is traceable to Condorcet
(Condorcet, 1788), who criticized the Borda rule on the grounds that it “relies on irrelevant factors
to form its judgments,” in that it “confuses votes comparing Peter and Paul with those comparing
either Peter or Paul to Jack and uses them to judge the relative merits of Peter and Paul.” While
the Borda rule respects the modern proscription on using cardinal measures of well-being, it slips
cardinality back into the social calculus through these types of third-option comparisons. Indeed,
Borda’ justification for the rule explicitly references cardinal inferences.4
Arrow’s celebrated Impossibility Theorem (Arrow, 1950) precludes the existence of any rule for
aggregating ordinal preferences satisfying IIA and certain other reasonable axioms. Yet groups cannot
avoid preference aggregation merely because they might run afoul of a theoretical axiom. One way or
another, they routinely make implicit or explicit judgments about tradeoffs between different members’
objectives. Our overall goal in this paper is to understand those judgments.5 In other words, we
1There is, however, a branch of the literature that attempts to justify such comparisons; see Roberts (2005) for a
review.
2Arrow’s assumption is ”that interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and ... that there is no meaning
relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility” (Arrow, 1951).
3According to IIA, if a change in group members’ preference rankings leaves the relative rankings of options A and
B unchanged, then it also leaves social preferences between A and B unchanged.
4According to Borda (Borda, 1781), “...we must assume that the degree of superiority which this voter gave A over
B is the same as that he gave B over C. As candidate B is no more likely to be ranked in one particular place on the
scale between A and C than in any other, we have no reason to say that the voter who ranked the candidates ABC
wanted to place B nearer A than C or vice versa; no reason to say, that is, that he accorded the first more superiority
over the second than he accorded the second over the third.”
5As in the literature on social welfare spawned by Arrow’s work, we abstract from the important problem of eliciting
accurate information about group members’ preferences, which is the subject of a related literature; see, for example,
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approach the classical social welfare question from a positive perspective rather than a normative
perspective.6 Illuminating fundamental attitudes toward ordinal preference aggregation is important
because those attitudes have potentially profound implications for public policy. For example, by
adopting institutions that tend to deliver desirable outcomes according to the Condorcet criterion, a
society will become susceptible to what Mill, in On Liberty, termed the “tyranny of the majority” (Mill,
1869). In contrast, by embracing institutions that tend to deliver desirable outcomes according to
the Borda rule, a society will provide greater protections for minority populations, whether associated
with geography, ideology, ethnicity, or religion.
Our analysis addresses four main questions. First, what rules and criteria do people actually follow
when aggregating ordinal preferences? For instance, do they impose compromise solutions, or insist
that the majority should prevail? Second are these rules stable, or do they vary from one context
to another? To what extent do they reflect structural principles of preference aggregation, rather
than contextual adaptations? Third, do people honor ordinal information, or do they try to make
cardinal imputations before aggregating? Fourth, do common aggregation rules vary across cultures
with divergent political and social traditions, and might such variation help to explain differences in
policies?
Identifying the rules that govern ordinal aggregation is conceptually challenging. Even in simple
social choice problems (e.g., with five people and three options), the set of possible mappings from
preference profiles to best choices is astronomically large. We therefore proceed in four steps. First,
drawing on the theoretical literature, we identify a reasonably large set of plausible aggregation rules.
Each of these rules implies a distinctive fingerprint of implied best choices over the set of conceivable
five-person three-option preference profiles. Second, we conduct an experiment in which subjects
in the role of Social Planner make a series of decisions for other groups of subjects (Stakeholders).
We assign each subject to a pre-specified rule using a Bayes classifier, which identifies the best match
between each subject’s empirical fingerprint and the theoretical fingerprints associated with the various
rules. Third, we corroborate the classifications using a handful of discerning four-option social choice
problems. Fourth, we use a clustering algorithm to determine whether our pre-specified rules omit
empirically important possibilities.
In order to elicit subject-level empirical fingerprints, each Social Planner makes decisions for mul-
tiple preference profiles, knowing that any one of them may involve a real group of Stakeholders who
care about the outcome. The Social Planners’ decisions are of two types: assignment decisions (dis-
tributing five work tasks among five Stakeholders), and spending decisions (assigning a contribution
on behalf of five Stakeholders to a single Swiss political party). We call these the work domain and
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). While issues of manipulability inevitably arise in practice, they pertain to
the constraints that appear in a mechanism design problem, rather than to the objective function, and it is the latter
we seek to illuminate. Notably, Borda was primarily concerned with the social welfare question, as he is said to have
described his preferred rule as intended for honest men (quoted in Black, 1958).
6It is arguable that, in representative democracies, policy makers ought to defer to citizens’ judgments about appro-
priate criteria for preference aggregation. Under that view, positive analyses of social choice have important normative
implications.
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the political domain, respectively. Most of our analysis focuses on the work domain; we examine the
political domain to evaluate context-sensitivity. Because we are interested in identifying structural
aggregation preferences, we design the experiment to remove considerations arising from self-interest,
paternalism (i.e., the tendency to ignore or discount Stakeholder judgments with which the Social
Planner disagrees, as in Ambuehl et al., 2021a), and the potential incentive incompatibility of truth-
ful preference revelation by Stakeholders.
In answer to the first question (which rules do people use), we find that the overwhelming majority
of subjects behave as if they rely on scoring rules, which assign a score to each rank and select best
options based on the total scores.7 The two most common as-if aggregation criteria are the Borda
rule (for which the score is linear in ranks), and near-antipluralilty (where antiplurality rule minimizes
the number of last-place ranks).8 A sizable majority (> 60%) of subjects employ strictly concave
scoring rules, of which antiplurality is an example. Substantively, these rules imply an even stronger
preference for compromise than the Borda rule; technically, they have the property that improvements
in low ranks are more important than improvements in high ranks. Condorcet (majoritarian) rules
are relatively rare, as is the related concept of plurality rule, and likewise associated runoff criteria.
Neither do people often gravitate toward supermajority or unanimity (Pareto) rules, even though
those also provide minorities with varying degrees of protection. The classification’s fit is excellent:
empirical and theoretical fingerprints for assigned rules are remarkably similar. Analysis of discerning
four-option profiles corroborates our conclusions concerning the prevalence of various rules. Clustering
analysis identifies only one non-pre-specified rule of consequence (> 2% of subjects), and it differs
from near-antiplurality on only one of 17 preference profiles.
In answer to the second question (stable structure versus contextual adaptations), we find that
our classifications are highly predictive of choices out of sample, including across domains. This result
reassures us that ordinal aggregation entails stable structural elements. This is not to say that the
distribution of rules is the same in the work domain and the political domain. On the contrary,
the differences between these distributions, though relatively small, are systematic and statistically
significant, which points to a degree of context-specificity.
In answer to the third question, we find strong indications that subjects aggregate ordinal prefer-
ences based in part on inferences about cardinal utility. As a threshold matter, it is worth emphasizing
that scoring rules provide latitude for injecting cardinal inferences into the social choice, whereas the
Condorcet rule does not. We explore this question in two ways. First, we provide evidence on the
validity of a choice axiom known as Sen’s α, which states that the removal of an unchosen option from
an opportunity set should not alter the selection from that set. We demonstrate that choices satisfy
7Consistent with this finding, Featherstone (2019) shows that, in the context of matching markets, policymakers
often evaluate matches based on rank distributions (a special case of scoring rules), and sometimes tinker with the
results of matching algorithms in attempts to improve the rank-distribution.
8Antiplurality is the scoring rule that assigns 0 to the last-place rank and 1 to all other ranks. It is thematically
related to (but substantively distinct from) last place aversion, which has been found in some experiments (Kuziemko
et al., 2014; Martinangeli and Windsteiger, 2020) but not others (Camerer et al., 2016).
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Sen’s α when the preference rankings provided to the Social Planner include the deleted item, but
severely violate Sen’s α when we also remove the item from the rankings. We infer that subjects likely
draw inferences about the intensity of preferences from comparisons with options that are generally
considered undesirable. Second, we examine the correlation between best-fit scoring parameters and
the scoring parameters our Social Planners would use if they were money-metric utilitarians, given
their elicited beliefs about Stakeholders’ reservation valuations for first-, second-, and third-ranked
choices. While the correlation corroborates the importance of cardinal inferences, further investigation
suggests that subjects attach substantial domain-independent weight to the various ordinal ranks. In
other words, they appear to deploy both cardinal and ordinal criteria.
To answer to the fourth question (comparisons across countries), we run supplemental experiments
using general population samples, wherein social choices determine the allocation of a contribution over
well-known charities. We find that the distributions of aggregation preferences in the U.S. and Sweden,
countries with divergent political and social traditions, are remarkably similar, and both resemble the
distribution for the student sample used in our main experiment.9 Policy differences may therefore
be attributable to other factors, such as beliefs, historical accidents, institutions, and/or equilibrium
selection, as hypothesized by Alesina and Angeletos (2005). Nevertheless, we find suggestive evidence
that the use of more concave scoring rules in experimental decisions correlates with a preference for
electing compromise candidates.
Most broadly, our paper contributes to the literature on positive welfare economics, which uses
empirical methods to determine how people evaluate the well-being of other individuals and groups
(e.g. Andreoni et al. (2020); Alm̊as et al. (2020); Ambuehl et al. (2021a); see Konow (2003); Gaertner
(2009); Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) for reviews). To our knowledge, only a handful of previous
papers in this area have attempted to address the problem of ordinal preference aggregation from
a positive perspective. The most closely related paper is Kara and Sertel (2005). Their analysis is
confined to three rules (Condorcet, Borda, and “majoritarian compromise”), which they distinguish
based on a few (four) preference profiles using hypothetical choices involving abstract options. In
contrast, we examine real choices, use far more exhaustive lists of rules and preference profiles, esti-
mate scoring parameters, use clustering analysis to detect omitted rules, test out-of-sample predictive
accuracy, examine stability across domains and cultures,10 investigate whether subjects try to make
cardinal inferences, and provide evidence of external validity using general population samples.
Other positive work on ordinal preference aggregation addresses different questions than ours.
The analysis in Weber (2017), which focuses on two-option choices, seeks to determine how subjects
weigh the votes of delegates who represent groups of different sizes in assemblies such as the EU.
Other related work elicits subjects’ preferences over (five or fewer) voting procedures, rather than
9Ambuehl et al. (2021b) include an abridged version of the current experiment in a study of elected representatives
in federal and state parliaments in Germany. They find similar qualitative results.
10Faravelli (2007) documents the importance of context in social decisions.
4
over outcomes (Engelmann and Grüner, 2017; Hoffmann and Renes, 2017; Engelmann et al., 2020).11
In these experiments, it is up to the subjects to imagine what each rule might imply for any particular
preference profile. Those inferences are often non-trivial, and it is possible that a subject would reject
a seemingly appealing rule after learning what it implies.12 In contrast, our subjects reveal their
preferences over rules by making choices over explicit social outcomes. Choices over procedures rather
than social outcomes may also implicate strategic considerations or procedural notions of justice and
equity, which we intentionally remove from our study in order to address the classical problem of
ordinal preference aggregation.
Our work is also related to the vast empirical literature on other-regarding preferences, which
generally studies preference aggregation in settings where cardinal information (typically concerning
money) is available (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Cooper and Kagel, 2016, for reviews). The
most closely related branch elicits preferences over the distribution of income (e.g. Epper et al., 2020;
Fisman et al., 2021). Most of this literature is concerned with self-versus-other tradeoffs, rather than
other-versus-other tradeoffs, although there are some exceptions. For example, Jackson and Yariv
(2014) examine how subjects in the role of a Social Planner aggregate others’ cardinal preferences
intertemporally in settings where rates of discount differ. An alternative to the self-versus-other and
other-versus-other paradigms examines social choice behind a veil of ignorance, as in Engelmann and
Strobel (2004). Those experimental settings tend to induce utilitarian decisions (Bolton and Ockenfels,
2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2014).
This paper draws heavily on, and complements, the theoretical social welfare literature (Arrow et
al., eds, 1991, 2010; Fishburn, 2015; Brandt et al., 2016). Most obviously, it documents the empirical
relevance of various rules, but there are other points of contact. By examining the tendency for people
to make cardinal inferences from ordinal information about preferences, we provide empirical context
for a theoretical literature on utilitarian-optimal voting rules (de Laplace, 1812; Weber, 1978; Merrill
III, 1984; Apesteguia et al., 2011; Boutilier et al., 2015; Pivato, 2016).13 Moreover, the low prevalence
of Condorcet rules suggests that most people do not accept Condorcet efficiency (the frequency with
which a rule selects the Condorcet winner when one exists) as a normative principle, contrary to
the position of Merrill III (1984) and others; see, for instance, Van Newenhizen (1992); Saari (2000);
Baharad and Nitzan (2003).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We lay out our main strategy for detecting
the use of specific social choice rules in Section 2. Section 3 details our experimental design. Section 4
11Another potential approach, which has been used in decision theory, is to ask subjects to endorse axioms rather
than rules; see, e.g., Nielsen and Rehbeck (2020). Unfortunately, Arrow’s theorem alerts us to the possibility that
people might well endorse inconsistent axioms. In addition, social choice axioms are often complex and difficult for
non-specialists to understand, and some common rules lack axiomatizations.
12Laslier (2012) reports the result of an informal vote by 22 voting theory experts on an ad hoc list of 18 aggregation
rules. The winner is approval voting, followed by instant runoff. That vote considers rules comprehensively whereas
this paper abstracts from strategic considerations to focus on the welfare (aggregation) question.
13Our conclusions concerning the tendency to infer cardinal values from ranks resonate with findings from a bargaining
experiment by Herreiner and Puppe (2010), in which subjects received ordinal information concerning each others’
preferences.
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provides our classification results and all associated analyses. Section 5 describes our supplementary
experiments involving general population samples. Section 6 provides some brief concluding remarks.
2 Conceptual framework
We are concerned with settings in which a decision maker, the Social Planner, must make a selection
from a set of K social options, A, on behalf of N Stakeholders. Each option has direct consequences
for the Stakeholders, but the Social Planner is not materially affected by her decision. We assume
throughout that each Stakeholder i has a linear preference ordering %i over A. To avoid technicalities
we assume the orderings are strict (a property that is, in any case, generic). Before making a decision,
the Social Planner learns the group’s preference profile, P = (%1, . . . ,%N ). A social choice rule is
a complete account of the Social Planner’s choices for every preference profile; in other words, it is
a mapping R from preference profiles into nonempty subsets of A (best choices).14 A resolute rule
admits no ties, in the sense that it maps every profile to single option. A rule is irresolute if at least
one preference profile maps to a non-singleton set, indicating that there is more than one best choice.
Our objective is to determine which social choice rules people actually use when making decisions
for others. The task of identifying these rules is challenging because the set of possibilities is astro-
nomically large. To illustrate, consider a simple setting with 5 Stakeholders, where the Social Planner
must choose among 3 options. In that case, the domain of any social choice rule satisfying anonymity
(meaning that the rule treats all group members symmetrically) and neutrality (meaning that the rule
treats all social options symmetrically) consists of 42 distinct preference profiles.15 A social choice
rule maps each of these profiles to a subset of the three options. Because there are seven such subsets,
there are 742 = 3.1 × 1035 possible social choice rules for this simple environment. While most are
unreasonable, 3.5× 1028 exhibit no Pareto violations.16
Because the set of potential social choice rules is so large, our analysis proceeds in three steps. First,
based on the literature, we identify a reasonably large collection of social choice rules encompassing
the most plausible alternatives. Second, we classify Social Planners according to the pre-specified
rules that most closely match their actual choices. Third, we deploy clustering analysis to determine
whether our pre-specified rules omit empirically important alternatives.
14Arrow (1950) studied social choice functions, which map preference profiles into rankings over social alternatives.
When A is finite, any social choice function F implies a corresponding social choice rule, which picks maximal elements
according to F .
15We identified these profiles using an algorithm that enumerated all the alternatives and then eliminated ones that
are redundant under anonymity and neutrality. It is also possible to arrive at the number of such profiles through a
combinatorial argument. According to The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy by Douglas Adams, the number 42 is
“The Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything,” calculated by a supercomputer over 7.5
million year, but unfortunately no one knows the question. We are delighted to have resolved that mystery. You’re
welcome.
16The Pareto criterion rules out nothing for 27 profiles, one option for 12 profiles, and two options for 3 profiles. The
number of rules without Pareto violations is therefore 727 × 312.
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In the remainder of this section, we summarize various social choice rules that our subjects may
employ, and explain conceptually how we distinguish among them.
2.1 Possible social choice rules
There are in principle many ways to categorize social choice rules. For our purposes, the most
useful classification references the nature of the information the rule employs. The reason is that,
in designing an experiment such as ours, one must be alert to the possibility that the method of
presenting information concerning the preference profile P may nudge the Social Planner toward one
type of social choice rule or another. Understanding the information requirements for various classes
of rules helps ensure a neutral presentation.
As an example, consider the Borda method, which selects options that minimize the sum of ranks
across all Stakeholders. To implement this rule, one must know, for each A ∈ A and k ∈ {1, ...,K},
the number of group members who rank option A k-th among the potential alternatives, denoted rkA.
We call this distillation of P the Borda data.
An important class of social choice rules known as scoring rules use only the Borda data. A scoring
rule establishes a score vector, w = (w1, w2, . . . , wK) with w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wK , and allocates w1 points
to each Stakeholder’s top-ranked alternative, w2 points to their second-ranked alternative, and so on.
It then selects an option that maximizes the sum of the scores.17 Taking wk = k for all k yields the
Borda rule. Plurality rule emerges as a special case: when w1 > 0 and wk = 0 for k > 1, the scoring
method maximizes first-place ranks. Alternatively, taking wk = w1 > 0 for k < K and wK = 0, the
scoring method minimizes last-place ranks, a rule known as negative voting or antiplurality.
As a second example, consider the Condorcet method, also known as pairwise majority rule, which
selects an option that majority-defeats all others (a Condorcet winner). To implement this rule, one
must know, for each pair of options, A,B ∈ A, the number of group members who rank A strictly
above B, denoted vAB . We call this distillation of P the Condorcet data.
The Condorcet method is a special case of a p-supermajority rule, which declares option A better
than option B if the fraction of Stakeholders who prefer A to B is at least p. The rule selects an option
if it is not improvable according to this binary relation. Condorcet corresponds to the case in which
p is the strict majority threshold, Unanimity rule (also know as the Pareto rule) to the case of p = 1,
and Supermajority rule to intermediate cases. All p-supermajority rules use only the Condorcet data.
A well-known limitation of the Condorcet method is that it can give rise to cycles, and consequently
does not yield a winner for certain preference profiles. The same issue arises for Supermajority rule,
but not for Unanimity rule. To apply Condorcet (or Supermajority) on an unrestricted domain, one
must supplement the rule. A Condorcet extension selects a Condorcet winner when one exists, but
17Myerson (1995) provides an axiomatic characterization of the set of scoring rules.
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otherwise employs some other criterion.18 An example is the top cycle or Smith set, defined as the
smallest collection of options that majority-defeat all options in the complement of the set. Many
Condorcet extensions use only the Condorcet data. Examples include the top cycle, the Minimax
method, Copeland’s rule, the Kemeny-Young method, Tideman’s rule, and the Schulze method.
Having distinguished between classes of rules according to information they employ, it is important
to emphasize that the Borda data are not in general recoverable from the Condorcet data, and the
Condorcet data are not in general recoverable from the Borda data. Accordingly, a presentation of
preference profiles that makes either type of information more salient could potentially skew choices
accordingly.
Some social choice rules require more complete information concerning preference profiles. For
example, Black’s method is the Condorcet extension that selects the Borda winner when a Condorcet
winner fails to exist. It therefore relies on both the Condorcet data and the Borda data. However,
that reliance is hierarchical, in the sense that the Condorcet data take precedence.
Multistage rules that winnow down the set of alternatives in a series of steps introduce almost lim-
itless possibilities, inasmuch as they can, in principle, apply different criteria in each step. Even when
the rule employs the same criterion round after round, the required information evolves. Consider, for
example, the set of runoff rules based on scoring criteria, which repeatedly eliminate the alternative
with the lowest score until only one option remains.19 A well-known example is the single transferrable
vote rule, which iteratively deletes options with the lowest plurality scores. Another is Baldwin’s rule,
which uses the Borda score. Such rules employ the Borda data for a sequence of shrinking menus.
That information is not recoverable from the Borda data for the original menu. Still, a presentation
that highlights the Borda data may encourage the use of such methods.
2.2 Main identification strategy
The core of our empirical analysis differentiates among social choice rules based on selections for
problems involving 5 Stakeholders and 3 options. This focus offers three advantages.
First, 5-Stakeholder 3-option problems are the simplest settings that provide adequate scope for
differentiation among a broad collection of rules. While the addition of Stakeholders or options can
in principle permit greater discernment, it can also render social choice problems less cognitively
manageable.
Second, with K options, the set of scoring rules is a K − 2 parameter family. Consequently, when
K = 3, we can associate each scoring rule with a single parameter, s. To understand this point, note
that without loss of generality, we can assign a score of 1 to a Stakeholder’s highest-ranked alternative,
and a score of 0 to her lowest-ranked alternative. The parameter s ∈ [0, 1] is then the score assigned
18See Definition 2.8 in Brandt et al. (2016). The Campbell-Kelly theorem characterizes the set of Condorcet extensions
(Theorem 2.3 in Brandt et al., 2016).
19For formal definitions and an axiomatic characterization, see Freeman et al. (2014).
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to the middle alternative. The cases of s = 0, s = 1/2, and s = 1 correspond to the Plurality,
Borda, and Negative Voting rules, respectively. The one-dimensionality of this class facilitates the
interpretation of our results. In particular, the function relating ranks to weights is concave when
s > 1/2, and convex when s < 1/2. Concavity (convexity) implies that replacing a third-place rank
with a second-place rank is more (less) valuable than replacing a second-place rank with a first-place
rank. Accordingly, concave scoring rules codify an aversion to giving Stakeholders their least favorite
choices, while convex scoring rules codify an attraction to giving Stakeholders their favorite choices.
These observations suggest that scoring rules may reflect inferences about cardinal utility,20 a point
to which we return in Section 4.6. They also suggest the interpretation of concavity as appreciation
of compromise.
Third, with 5 Stakeholders and 3 options, we can in principle investigate choices exhaustively
on the entire preference domain. As noted above, for social choice rules satisfying neutrality and
anonymity, there are 42 distinct strict preference profiles. Eliciting a choice for every conceivable
profile is therefore feasible.
In practice, many of the 42 preference profiles provide little or no discernment among rules. For
example, if all Stakeholders have the same ranking, the best social choice is obvious. Including
such problems lengthens the experiment, thereby risking the erosion of subjects’ effort and attention,
without adding significant value. Accordingly, we omit profiles that provide little or no differentiation
among well-known rules. Our analysis is based on the 17 discerning profiles listed in Table 1. In
Appendix A.1, we list the omitted profiles and exhibit their limited ability to distinguish among rules.
Table 1 also shows how the 17 profiles differentiate among familiar social choice rules. For example,
if a subject uses a scoring rule, we can determine the parameter s from the choices they make for
profiles 1 through 11. To understand this point, first consider profile 11. Because all subjects rank
option B second, its score is Ss(B) = 5s. Four subjects rank option C first and one ranks it third, so
its score is Ss(C) = 4. Option A is rank-dominated by C, so no scoring rule will select it. Therefore,
the subject will choose option B if Ss(B) > Ss(C), or equivalently, s > 0.8, and will choose option
C if s < 0.8. If s = 0.8, the subject is indifferent between options B and C. Now consider profile 6,
which differs from profile 11 only in that Stakeholder 2’s preferences between A and C are reversed.
Reasoning as before, we see that scoring rules select B over C when s > 0.6.
Profiles 1 through 11 constitute the set of all profiles for which there are exactly two options that
are not weakly rank-dominated. For each, there is a threshold s̄ at which the optimal choice switches,
as in the cases of profiles 6 and 11. These thresholds divide the interval [0, 1] into a sequence of










5 , 1}. Based on decisions for profiles 1-11,
20Apesteguia et al. (2011) formalize this point.
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Table 1: Three-alternative profiles.
Index Profile Rule predictions
Scoring cutoff Scoring rules. s ∈ Condorcet Runoff rules, s ∈









1∗ A A C C C 1/3 C C {A,C} A A C C C C {A,C}
B B A A A
C C B B B
2 A C C B B 1/3 {B,C} B {A,B} A A A B A A {A,B}
B A A A A
C B B C C
3∗ A A A C C 1/2 A A {A,C} C C A A A A {A,C}
B C C B B
C B B A A
4∗ A A B B B 1/2 B B {A,B} A A B B B B {A,B}
B C A A A
C B C C C
5 A C C C B 1/2 C C {B,C} B B C C C C {B,C}
B B B B A
C A A A C
6∗ A A C C C 3/5 C C {B,C} B B C C C C {B,C}
B B B B B
C C A A A
7 A C C C B 2/3 C C {B,C} B B C C C C {A,B}
B A B B A
C B A A C
8∗ A C C C B 2/3 C C {B,C} B B C C C C {B,C}
B B B B C
C A A A A
9∗ A A A B B 3/4 A A {A,C} C C A A A A {A,C}
B C C C C
C B B A A
10 A C C C C 3/4 C C {A,C} A A C C C C {A,C}
B A A A A
C B B B B
11∗ A C C C C 4/5 C C {B,C} B B C C C C {B,C}
B B B B B
C A A A A
12 A C C B B 0 - - {B,C} C C {A,B,C} B B B {A,C}
B A A C C
C B B A A
13 A C C B B 1/2 {B,C} {B,C} {A,B,C} A A {A,B,C} B B {A,B,C} {A,B,C}
B A A C A
C B B A C
14 A C C B B 0 - - {B,C} {B,C} {B,C} B B B B {B,C}
B A B C C
C B A A A
15 A C C B B 0 - - {B,C} B {A,B} B B B B {A,B}
B A B A A
C B A C C
16 A C C B B 0 - - {B,C} B B B B B B {A,B}
B A B C A
C B A A C
17 A C C B B 0 - - {B,C} B B B B B B {A,B}
B B B A A
C A A C C
Notes: Each profile is displayed as a 3×5-matrix. Columns correspond to Stakeholders and rows to preference ranks.
A Stakeholder’s first, second, and third-ranked alternatives are listed in the first, second, and third rows, respectively.
For Condorcet-cyclical profiles, we indicate the set of options in the top-cycle. For decisions in the political domain, we
only use the profiles indicated with an asterisk.
we can determine which interval contains the subject’s scoring parameter.21 In some cases, we can
also distinguish choices based on scoring parameters at the boundaries of these intervals.22
As shown in Table 1, the remaining profiles provide further scope for differentiating among social
choice rules. For example, because profiles 12 and 13 exhibit Condorcet cycles, all three options are
best choices according to the top-cycle Condorcet extension, but not according to many other rules.
Each social choice rule generates an identifiable “fingerprint” of selections across the 17 preference
profiles; see Figure 1. Each column in the figure represents a 5-Stakeholder 3-option preference
profile, which we identify in the first panel. For example, the first column corresponds to the profile
wherein two Stakeholders prefer A to B to C, while three prefer C to A to B. Each subsequent panel
corresponds to a specified social choice rule; it shows the options that rule selects for each preference
profile. Comparing the fingerprints across rules (panels) reveals both similarities and differences.
Our main classification results encompass 22 benevolent social choice rules.23 We start with the
15 distinguishable rules that emerge from the scoring method. We can differentiate between s = 12
(the Borda rule), 5 ranges of scoring parameters in the convex range (the most extreme of which
corresponds to Plurality rule), and 10 ranges of strictly concave rules (the most extreme of which
corresponds to Antiplurality rule). Our data can also differentiate among 4 social choice rules that
emerge from the scoring runoff method. These rules correspond to values of s in the following ranges:




2 ), and [
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2 , 1), as well as s = 1.
24 Finally, we can distinguish three social choice rules that
emerge from the p-supermajority top-cycle method. These rules correspond to values of p in the






5 ], and (
4
5 , 1]. Henceforth we adopt a slight abuse of terminology and
call these rules Condorcet, Supermajority, and Unanimity, respectively. While our basic classification
does not include other Condorect extensions, we conduct robustness analyses to determine whether
this omission is material.
Because we distinguish between social choice rules based on their fingerprints, larger differences
between fingerprints facilitate more reliable classifications. Figure 2 tabulates, for each pair of social
choice rules, the number of preference profiles (out of the 17 we use for identification) for which their
implications differ. Two patterns stand out. First, in the vast majority of cases, different rules have
different implications for large numbers of profiles. Ignoring the diagonal, few of the entries in Panel
A are less than 3, and many are greater than 8, indicating differences on more than half of profiles.
21As indicated in Table 1, profile 13 provides corroborative evidence as to whether s ≶ 1
2
, and the remaining profiles
shed light on whether s = 0.
22When a scoring parameter coincides with an interval boundary s ∈ C, the set of options selected for a given
preference profile is the union of those selected with scoring parameter s− ε and those selected with scoring parameter
s+ ε for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Accordingly, scoring rules with parameters s ∈ C are less resolute (produce more ties)
than scoring rules with parameter s /∈ C.
23We define a rule as benevolent if it satisfies the Pareto criterion.
24We implement scoring runoff rules as follows. In the first stage, we calculate the score associated with each option
and drop the option with the lowest score. We then choose the majority-preferred option from the remaining alternatives.
(Because this step involves at most two options, majority rules coincides with all scoring rules.) If two options are tied,
we drop both of them. If all three options are tied, the runoff rule selects all of them. Three-way ties occur only for
profile 13, and only for scoring runoff rules with s ≥ 1
2
. We identify the set of distinguishable scoring runoff rules using
a brute-force computer script.
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Figure 1: Fingerprints of an example selection of social choice rules.
Preference profile
Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
A > B > C 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A > C > B 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C > A > B 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 2 2 1 1 1 0
C > B > A 0 0 2 0 3 3 2 3 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 1 2
B > C > A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 0





















Notes: Each column corresponds to a three-alternative preference profile. Preference profiles are listed in the top row.
The number in each cell in the top row indicates the number of Workers with the indicated preference ranking. Cells
in the top row indicate the number of subjects with each of the preference orderings listed on the left of that row.
Each cell in rows 2 to 5 is labeled 1 if the rule chooses the corresponding option and 0 if the rule does not choose the
option. Non-resolute rules will choose more than one option for some profiles. Shades of blue indicate the number of
tied options. The numbering of preference profiles corresponds to Table 1.
Second, three clusters of similar rules are visible. The first cluster consists of the strictly convex
scoring rules numbered 2 to 4. The second cluster corresponds to the strictly concave scoring rules,
numbered 6 to 15 (especially 6 to 8 and 12 to 15). Because these rules are members of the single
family that is indexed by a continuous parameter s, adjacent rules tend to differ on small numbers of
profiles, but more distant scoring rules are more easily differentiated. The third cluster consists of the
scoring runoff rules with s < 1 (numbered 16 to 18). Observe also that the runoff rules, as well as the
Condorcet rule (number 20), align more closely with convex scoring rules than with concave scoring
rules. Hence, a preference for compromise may push subjects away from scoring runoff rules.
12























































































































































































































Scoring, s = 0 0 5 6 6 10 10 11 11 13 13 15 15 16 16 16 7 7 7 16 7 15 17
Scoring, 0 < s < 1
3 5 0 2 2 6 6 7 7 9 9 11 11 12 12 13 3 4 4 16 4 15 17
Scoring, s = 1
3 6 2 0 2 6 6 7 7 9 9 11 11 12 12 13 5 5 5 14 5 15 16
Scoring, 1
3
< s < 1
2 6 2 2 0 4 4 5 5 7 7 9 9 10 10 11 5 4 4 16 4 15 17
Scoring, s = 1
2 10 6 6 4 0 4 5 5 7 7 9 9 10 10 11 8 7 6 12 6 14 15
Scoring, 1
2
< s < 3
5 10 6 6 4 4 0 1 1 3 3 5 5 6 6 7 8 7 7 16 7 15 17
Scoring, s = 3
5 11 7 7 5 5 1 0 1 3 3 5 5 6 6 7 9 8 8 15 8 15 17
Scoring, 3
5
< s < 2
3 11 7 7 5 5 1 1 0 2 2 4 4 5 5 6 9 8 8 16 8 15 17
Scoring, s = 2
3 13 9 9 7 7 3 3 2 0 2 4 4 5 5 6 11 10 10 15 10 15 17
Scoring, 2
3
< s < 3
4 13 9 9 7 7 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 3 3 4 11 10 10 16 10 15 17
Scoring, s = 3
4 15 11 11 9 9 5 5 4 4 2 0 2 3 3 4 13 12 12 14 12 16 16
Scoring, 3
4
< s < 4
5 15 11 11 9 9 5 5 4 4 2 2 0 1 1 2 13 12 12 16 12 16 17
Scoring, s = 4
5 16 12 12 10 10 6 6 5 5 3 3 1 0 1 2 14 13 13 15 13 17 17
Scoring, 4
5
< s < 1 16 12 12 10 10 6 6 5 5 3 3 1 1 0 1 14 13 13 16 13 17 17
Scoring, s = 1 16 13 13 11 11 7 7 6 6 4 4 2 2 1 0 15 14 14 15 14 17 17
Runoff, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
3 7 3 5 5 8 8 9 9 11 11 13 13 14 14 15 0 1 2 17 3 15 17
Runoff, 1
3
< s < 1
2 7 4 5 4 7 7 8 8 10 10 12 12 13 13 14 1 0 1 17 2 15 17
Runoff, 1
2
< s < 1 7 4 5 4 6 7 8 8 10 10 12 12 13 13 14 2 1 0 16 1 14 16
Runoff, s = 1 16 16 14 16 12 16 15 16 15 16 14 16 15 16 15 17 17 16 0 16 16 13
Condorcet 7 4 5 4 6 7 8 8 10 10 12 12 13 13 14 3 2 1 16 0 13 15
Supermajority 15 15 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 15 16 16 17 17 17 15 15 14 16 13 0 4
Unanimity 17 17 16 17 15 17 17 17 17 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 13 15 4 0
Notes: This graph plots the set of 22 benevolent rules on both the horizontal and vertical axes. Each cell reports the
number of profiles (out of the 17 used in the work domain) for which a given pair of rules differ from each other. We
use the definition that two rules differ on a profile if they select a different subset of options (distance = 1); otherwise
they do not differ on that profile (distance = 0).
3 Experimental design
3.1 Social choice problems
Overview We assign subjects to one of two roles: each Social Planner (‘she’) chooses alternatives
that potentially affect groups of five Stakeholders (‘he’). The only purpose of including Stakeholders
in the experiment is to ensure that the Social Planners’ decisions are consequential. Choice problems
fall into two domains, task assignment (work) problems and budget allocation (political) problems.
These domains relate, respectively, to mechanism design and political economy, two areas where
ordinal preference aggregation is an important topic. For each domain, the Social Planner views a
sequence of preference profiles and, in each instance, selects one of several alternatives. We match
one out of every four Social Planners, selected at random, with a real group of Stakeholders. The
actual preference profile for that group is among the ones that Social Planner considers, but is not
identified as such. Although we only implement decisions that pertain to actual Stakeholder groups,
from each Social Planner’s perspective any one of her decisions could turn out to be a real choice.
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Consequently, as long as she cares about the Stakeholders to some degree, she has an incentive to
reveal her aggregation preferences truthfully for every preference profile she encounters. We focus
primarily on the work domain, for which we employ the 17 profiles shown in Table 1. We examine
the political domain, for which we employ a smaller set of profiles, to evaluate context-dependence.
Tasks for the work domain For the work domain, Stakeholders are workers, whom we recruit
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each worker receives $15 for completing a single assigned task.25 The
compensation is sufficiently high to ensure that any attrition is non-systematic.
There are five work tasks. We choose tasks that resemble familiar activities for online workers,
and that different workers might plausibly rank in different orders. The tasks are as follows: (i) Image
labeling. The worker views a sequence of 400 images and identifies each by clicking a button. (ii)
Hate speech filtering. The worker views 400 messages posted on twitter.com and indicates whether
each includes hate speech such as racist or sexist statements. (iii) Audio transcription. The worker
listens to a sequence of 400 words and, in each case, identifies the word by clicking a button. (iv)
Movie reviews classification. The worker classifies 400 movie reviews according to whether they are
positive or negative. (v) Assigning apprentices to mentors. The worker finds a pairwise stable match
between five hypothetical apprentices and five hypothetical mentors knowing their preferences. The
worker completes 20 rounds of this task.
Workers reveal their preferences over tasks in a preliminary session. After seeing a description
of each task and trying it out to gain familiarity (except for the matching task, a single round of
which some subjects find time-consuming), workers then rank the tasks from most to least preferred.
We ensure incentive compatibility by informing workers that their rankings determine the task they
perform with 5% probability, as follows: the computer randomly pre-selects two tasks, and workers
perform the one they say they prefer. To preclude strategic reporting, we tell workers that some
other process will determine their assigned tasks with 95% probability. Because we leave that process
unspecified, workers have no information about the manner in which their own expressed preferences
may factor into the alternative process. After the Social Planners make their choices, Workers complete
their assigned tasks in a second session.
Social choice problems for the work domain A social alternative is a task assignment : it assigns
each of the five tasks to one of the five workers in a group. Social Planners choose from menus of task
assignments. For 3-option problems, menus consist of three randomly selected task assignments.
For the main portion of our experiment, Social Planners are students at the University of Zurich
and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. (We examine US and Swedish general population
samples in Section 5). At the beginning of the experiment, they acquaint themselves with the work
tasks by reading descriptions and performing abbreviated versions (except for the matching task).
25Our survey automatically checks for correctness and requires the worker to continue until the entire task is completed
correctly.
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Their instructions describe the mTurk platform and provide information on the value of hourly worker
compensation in our experiment.
A Social Planner proceeds through several rounds of decision making for her group. In each round,
she observes an ordinal preference profile for the task assignments. One of these corresponds to her
workers’ actual preferences over task assignments, which we infer from their elicited preferences over
tasks.26 The Social Planner then chooses an assignment she considers best for the group. We also ask
her to identify any alternative she considers just as good as the one she selects. While this expression
of indifference has no consequences within our experiment, two considerations may mitigate the usual
concerns about hypothetical choices: first, the question asks the Social Planner to report indifference
that she presumably would have recognized when making the associated consequential choice moments
prior; second, misrepresenting her indifference would not serve any other plausible objective (e.g.,
enhancement of social image).27 However, as a precaution, we adopt two complementary approaches
to identifying social choice rules, one of which uses the indifference data, and one which does not.
Recent research on paternalism shows that people tend to discount or even disregard preferences
with which they disagree (Ambuehl et al., 2021a). That consideration is orthogonal to the focus of the
current paper, which concerns the aggregation of ordinal preferences that are equally valid in the eyes
of the Social Planner. To ensure that Social Planners cannot second-guess a worker’s preferences (for
example, by placing little weight on an expressed desire to complete the hate-speech filtering task), we
limit the Social Planner’s knowledge about task assignments. Specifically, we show the Social Planner
a menu of abstract geometric symbols, explain that each represents a task assignment, and describe
each worker’s ranking of those assignments. However, we do not explain which worker performs which
task in any given assignment.
In Section 2.1, we emphasized that different social choice rules use different data concerning pref-
erence orderings, and consequently that the presentation of preference profiles can potentially nudge
Social Planners in one direction or another by highlighting particular information. Because a prefer-
ence profile is an array of three-tuples of the form (option, worker, rank) that indicate the preference
rank a particular worker assigns to a given option, there are three qualitatively different ways to dis-
play it in a two-dimensional table: rows and columns can be ranks and workers (in which case options
appear in cells), ranks and options (in which case workers appear in cells), or workers and options (in
which case ranks appear in cells).
We show the first possibility in Figure 3, which represents each worker as a vertical bar. Within
each bar, the geometric symbols representing the assignments are ordered according to the worker’s
26This information captures the workers’ selfish preferences over task assignments. Any social preferences workers
may have over task assignments might be interdependent, in the sense that each worker may wish to take other workers’
preferences into account. To avoid such issues, we leave all interpersonal judgments to the Social Planner.
27An alternative procedure would be to (partially) incentivize indifference statements by randomizing among the
pertinent options. We decided against that approach for two reasons. First, the procedure changes the nature of
social alternatives by introducing lotteries over assignments, and thereby implicating workers’ preferences over lotteries.
Second, the social choice rules we consider do not specify random resolution. Adding that provision to a rule amounts
to creating a non-standard extension.
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preference, with the most preferred assignment on top. By clicking buttons, Social Planners can
highlight or hide options. Highlighting an option makes the distribution of its ranks (the Borda
data) readily apparent. When an option is hidden, the display repositions the remaining assignments
onto two lines. This feature makes pairwise preference counts (the Condorcet data) readily apparent.
Additionally, Social Planners can hide or rearrange the workers, either by dragging and dropping
them, or by clicking a button to shuffle them randomly.
We show the second and third possibilities in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. With these presenta-
tions, the Borda data are arguably more salient, but Social Planners can easily access the Condorcet
data by hiding options one at a time. Accordingly, we provide the same tools for exploration (hiding,
highlighting, and rearranging).
Each Social Planner sees one and only one presentation format, which we select at random. We
randomize symbols (representing options) and colors (representing workers) to ensure Social Planners
do not conflate decisions across preference profiles.28 We also randomize the positions of all alternatives
and of all workers in each round.
In addition to the 17 preference profiles shown in Figure 1, each Social Planner who is matched to a
real group of five workers views that group’s actual preference profile and makes a choice, while other
Social Planners view a randomly generated preference profile. Social Planners also make decisions for
six four-option preference profiles and one two-option profile, which we randomly intermingle with
the three-option profiles. Social Planners then view three final preference profiles, each of which rank
either three or four alternatives, but they choose from menus that omit one of the alternatives. We
provide more detail concerning all of these additional profiles and decisions in Sections 4.4 and 4.6.
Altogether, Social Planners make choices for 28 preference profiles in the work domain.
The political domain To determine whether Social Planners apply consistent aggregation criteria
across domains, we also present them with decisions involving political contributions. In this domain,
Stakeholders (citizens) are voting-age members of the general Swiss population.29 Social Planners,
who are also voting-age Swiss nationals, direct a contribution of Fr. 30 (roughly $33.90 at the time
of the experiment) to one of the five largest Swiss political parties, as measured by the number of
members in the Swiss National Council.
The procedures we use for political contributions are generally the same as for the work domain.30
Here it is especially important to emphasize that, for any given preference profile, Social Planners
28For instance, this procedure prevents a Social Planner from deciding to favor the ‘red worker’ in one round because
she disfavored that worker in the previous round.
29We recruited Stakeholders mostly through the survey company pollfish.com. We supplemented this sample by
placing ads on Facebook and in the laboratory at the University of Zurich. Age and citizenship are self-reported.
30One exception involves the process for eliciting Stakeholders’ preferences: citizens’ expressed preferences determine
the recipient of the donation with 2.5% probability, versus 5% probability for the analogous contingency in the work
domain.
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Figure 3: Social Planners’ decision interface, version 1 (options in cells).
Notes: Subjects can drag and drop columns, click a button to shuffle columns, highlight choice options, hide choice
options, and hide workers. If a subject hides an option, the remaining options are arranged on two rows regardless of
their initial position. Symbols for options and colors for the bars representing each worker are randomly drawn each
round. The order of workers is randomly drawn each round.
do not know which geometric symbol corresponds to which party, so they cannot impose their own
political preferences.31
31To prevent Social Planners from drawing inferences about parties from preference distributions, we draw the group
of five citizens from a sample that equally represents those who self-identify as politically left, right, and center. Social
Planners are aware of the sample’s composition.
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Figure 4: Social Planners’ decision interface, version 2 (individuals in cells)
Notes: Subjects can drag and drop columns, click a button to shuffle columns, hide choice options, highlight workers,
and hide workers. If a subject hides an option, only two rows are shown; the remaining rows are labeled ‘Best of 2’ and
‘Worst of 2.’ Symbols for options and colors for worker symbols are randomly drawn each round. The order of options
is randomly drawn each round.
To keep the length of the experiment manageable for our subjects, we use a smaller set of preference
profiles for the political domain. Over 12 rounds, Social Planners view, in random order, the starred
preference profiles in Column 2 of Table 1, a selection of four four-option profiles (see Section 4.4), and
one additional profile (either the actual profile for her assigned citizen group or a randomly generated
profile, depending on whether we assign her to a group).
3.2 Additional elicitations
Beliefs about WTA / WTP For the work domain, we ask Social Planners to predict the average
reservation wages for the tasks workers rank first, second, and third, knowing only that rankings
involve three tasks randomly selected from the five possibilities.32 To increase statistical power, Social
Planners answer five (nearly) redundant versions of these questions, where each version specifies the
32Possible answers range from $0 to $10 in increments of $0.50. Half of the subjects see these questions ordered by
rank (first, second, third), and half see them ordered by reverse rank (third, second, first). Before subjects answer these
questions, we remind them about the price and income level in the US and the standard wages of mTurk workers. The
instructions for these tasks explain the concept of WTP using an example for which we randomize the elicited valuation
(either $5 or $1).
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Figure 5: Social Planners’ decision interface, version 3 (ranks in cells)
Notes: Subjects can drag and drop columns, drag and drop rows, click a button to shuffle columns, click a button to
shuffle rows, highlight preference ranks, hide choice options, and hide workers. If a subject hides an option, only two
symbols, labeled ‘best’ and ‘worst’ are shown. The color of the symbols labeled ‘best’ and ‘worst’ differs depending on
whether two or three options are displayed, to signify that the best (worst) option among two is not necessarily best
(worst) among three. Symbols for options and colors for worker symbols are randomly drawn each round. The orders
of workers and options are randomly drawn each round. Colors for the preference ranks are randomly drawn on the
individual level but remain constant throughout the experiment.
city and state where the worker lives.33 In the event one of these predictions ends up determining the
Social Planner’s payment, she receives Fr. 30 minus Fr. 3 for every dollar by which her prediction
differs from the truth, which we assess using incentivized multiple decision lists in preliminary sessions
involving a separate set of workers.34
For the political domain, we ask Social Planners to predict the average Swiss citizen’s willingness
to pay to trigger or prevent the donation workers rank first, second, and third. The details are the
same as for the work domain, with a few small exceptions.35
33We use two sets of five city labels, randomly assigned, so we can determine whether the labels are consequential.
34Social Planners also indicate their own reservation price for completing each of the five tasks, but these responses
are unincentivized.
35Possible predictions for the WTP to trigger the donation lie in the set {>15, 15, 13, 11, 9, 7, 5, 3, 1, -1, -3, -5 ,-7,
-9, -11, -13, -15, <-15}. Over the five rounds, Social Planners make predictions for citizens with different first names
rather than different cities of residence.
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As we discuss subsequently, we use these responses to assess the hypothesis that Social Planners
aggregate ordinal preferences based on implicit inferences about cardinal utility (as suggested in
Apesteguia et al., 2011).
Risk preferences We elicit risk preferences using the method developed in Holt and Laury (2002).
On each line of a multiple decision list, subjects choose between two lotteries. The first lottery
pays Fr. 23 with probability p or Fr. 15 with probability (1 − p). The second pays Fr. 38
with probability p or Fr. 3 with probability (1 − p). The list includes 11 binary choices with
p ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. In a second otherwise identical decision list, the first
lottery pays either Fr. 20 or Fr. 13, while the second pays either Fr. 34 or Fr. 5.
Social preferences Subjects complete a multiple decision list involving the following pairs of al-
ternatives: “Increase each of the five workers’ payoffs by $2. Decrease my own study payment by
CHF X,” or “Do not increase the group members’ payoffs. Leave my own study payment unchanged.”
Each line employs a different value of X in the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20}. In an oth-
erwise identical second list, the first option is “Increase each of the five workers’ payoffs by Fr.
X (exchanged to USD). Decrease my own study payment by Fr. 5X,” and the values of X lie in
{0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2}. Notice that the first list implicates both efficiency and equity,
while the second implicates only equity.
Psychological characteristics, knowledge of social choice theory, and demographics Sub-
jects complete the four-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test by Thomson and Oppenheimer
(2016). For the last 143 subjects, we added four questions probing their knowledge of social choice
theory.36 Subjects also report a variety of personal characteristics.37
3.3 Additional details
Timing Table 2 provides an overview of the experiment’s temporal structure. Social Planners
perform ordinal preference aggregation tasks in parts A (work domain) and B (political domain).
Within each domain, we display preference profiles in individually random order. We also randomize
the order of Parts A and B, and include instructions about the decision interface in the part that
appears first. To avoid nudging subjects to think about cardinal utility, we elicit risk aversion and
beliefs about WTA/WTP in Part C, after the preference aggregation tasks are complete.
36Subjects report whether they have taken a class covering pertinent topics. We illustrate a three-option, three-citizen
cyclical preference profile and ask subjects to name the paradox. We also ask subjects to name the Borda rule and
Arrow’s impossibility theorem based on verbal descriptions.
37These include: gender, age, field of study and degree level they are working towards, grades in university entrance
exams in mathematics and in their first language, canton in which they completed their university entrance exam, their
main language, whether they live with their parents, their number of siblings, monthly spending, religiosity, religion,
political stance, and political party they voted for in the last election of the Swiss National Council.
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Table 2: Schematic overview of the experiment.
Part 0: Initial instructions
Part A: Task assigment
1. Instructions concerning task assignment
2. Instructions about the interface that displays preference profiles
3. 25 task assignment decisions (intermingled)
4. 3 task assignment decisions with unavailable options (intermingled)
Part B: Donation to a political party
1. Instructions concerning the donation to a political party
2. 12 party donation decisions
Part C: Further elicitations
1. Beliefs
• 5 rounds of incentivized belief elicitation about workers’ reservation wages, followed by an
unincentivized elicitation of own reservation wages for completing each of the five tasks
• 6 rounds of incentivized belief elicitation about citizens’ political preferences, followed by
an unincentivized elicitation of own willingness to pay to trigger or prevent the donation






• Cognitive Reflection Test
• Knowledge about social choice theory
Notes: Each stage in Part C directly follows instructions concerning that stage. Half of the subjects proceed through
the experiment in the order displayed. For the other half, Part B and Part A are interchanged. The latter subjects
receive the instructions about the interface that displays preference profiles in Part B instead of in Part A. For those
subjects, the two stages of Part C.1 are also interchanged.
Incentives A randomly selected decision (pertaining to WTP/WTA, risk preferences, or social
preferences) from part C determines the Social Planner’s own payment. As we have explained, social
21
choices are incentivized in the sense that each one may be consequential for others, and we also
incentivize the elicitation of workers’ preferences.
Instructions and comprehension checks The full instructions for Social Planners, which we
present on-screen, appear in Appendix E.1. The presentation requires subjects to try out each option
in the preference display (e.g., hide and highlight). Subjects must pass two comprehension checks
to continue with the study.38 Each consists of nine questions. The first set concerns the preference
displays and the second concerns the general decision environment. Subjects must answer all nine
questions correctly to proceed. If they make a mistake, we ask them to review the instructions and
try again, but we do not tell them which question(s) they missed.39 We conduct the experiment
English.40
4 Analysis
Our analysis focuses on 405 subjects in the role of Social Planner recruited from the joint subject pool
of the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Subjects participated in 11
online sessions, supervised via video-conferencing software (Zoom), in January 2021. We restricted
the sample to Swiss citizens by checking each participants’ government-issued ID.
The median subject completed the session in 82 minutes and received Fr. 50.41 In addition to
the 405 subjects who completed the study, another 12 potentially eligible subjects started it.42 Only
five subjects failed to complete the experiment after presenting a valid ID. The implied attrition rate
among potentially eligible subjects was therefore between 1.2% and 3%. The median age is 23. Among
the subjects who were asked, 7% reported having taken a class that covered social choice theory, but
only 1%, 3%, and 2% could correctly name Arrow’s theorem, the Condorcet paradox, and the Borda
rule, respectively. While our subject pool includes a higher proportion of women (61%) than men and
skews towards the political left (70%, 15%, and 14% of subjects rate themselves as left, center, and
right, respectively), Section 5 shows that similar results obtain in general population samples.
We structure our analysis as follows. Subsection 4.1 exhibits aggregate choice patterns. Subsection
4.2 presents our main classification results for the work domain. In Subsection 4.3, we use cluster-
ing methods to determine whether our classification omits any empirically important social choice
rules. Subsection 4.4 provides corroborating evidence on classifications using discerning four-option
profiles. Subsection 4.5 then investigates the extent to which our classification captures structural ag-
gregation principles by comparing choices across domains and by evaluating out-of-sample predictive
38These are also listed in Appendix E.1.
39This feature prevents the subject from trying to pass the comprehension check by trial and error (the chance of
passing either of the comprehension checks by chance is less than 0.2%).
40A good command of English is a curricular requirement for all students in our subject pool. The invitation emails
mention that subjects must be fluent in English.
41At the time of the experiment, 1 Fr. = USD 1.13.
42An additional 7 subjects started the study but were not eligible.
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performance. In Subsection 4.6, we investigate the extent to which aggregation rules reflect cardinal
imputations. Throughout, we pool across the three methods of presenting preference profiles, but
mention instances where results differ.
4.1 Aggregate choice patterns
Figure 6 shows choice frequencies for each of the 17 three-option profiles in the work domain. Structure
is readily apparent, such as the near-unanimous decisions for profiles 2, 16, and 17. Because nearly
all subjects choose the option that is both rank-dominant and a Condorcet winner in profiles 16 and
17, we can infer that they act benevolently toward their groups. Notably, disagreements are common
for the score-identifying profiles 3 to 11, indicating heterogeneity in preferred aggregation criteria.
Figure 6: Distribution of choices in three-option problems
Profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Condorcet C A A B C C C C A C C ABCABC B B B B
Scoring
s̄ 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/5 2/3 2/3 3/4 3/4 4/5 - 1/2 0 0 0 0
s < s̄ C Ba) A B C C C C A C C Ca) BC - - - -
s > s̄ A A C A B B B B C A B C A BC Bb) B B
Choice freq.
A 86 96 36 63 1 0 1 1 72 29 1 1 73 1 6 1 1
B 0 2 0 37 75 61 43 39 3 0 29 8 15 62 93 98 99
C 13 1 64 0 24 38 56 60 25 70 70 91 13 37 1 1 0
a) For s = 0, {B,C} is selected.
b) For s = 1, {A,B} is selected.
Notes: Darker shades of blue indicate higher frequencies. The numerical percentage appears within each shaded cell.
The profile numbering is the same as for Table 1.
Patterns for profiles 1 and 2 anticipate our overall conclusions. If, just for the moment, we confine
attention to scoring rules and the Condorcet top-cycle extension, we would infer that 86% of subjects
use scoring rules with s > 13 (because they choose A in profile 1), that only 2-3% of subjects use
scoring rules with s < 13 (because they choose B or C in profile 2), and that 10% of subjects use the
Condorcet rule (because the fraction of A increases from 86% to 96% between profiles 1 and 2).
Choices for profiles 12 and 13 corroborate the low prevalence of the Condorcet rule, in that we
see little indication of indeterminacy despite the presence of cycles. For profile 12, 91% of subjects
agree on option C, which is rank-dominant, and for profile 13, 73% of subjects select option A, which
minimizes the number of last-place ranks.
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Choices for profiles 3, 4, and 5 corroborate the prevalence of concave scoring rules, which select
options C (64%), A (63%), and B (75%), respectively. In contrast, all convex scoring rules and the
Condorcet rule select options A (36%), B (37%), and C (24%). Either pattern is consistent with the
Borda rule, which is only partially resolute for these profiles.
4.2 Main classification
4.2.1 Classification procedures
Next we classify individual subjects according to the social choice rules they appear to use. We deploy
two Bayes classification procedures (Hastie et al., 2001), which assign each subject to the rule with the
greatest posterior probability conditional on her observed choices under distributional assumptions
detailed below.43
The first Bayes classification procedure only relies on consequential choices (i.e., it excludes infor-
mation on indifference). The data for each subject then consists of 17 options, one for each preference
profile. We make the following four assumptions (analogously to Costa-Gomes et al., 2001): (i) The
prior distribution over pre-specified rules is uniform. (ii) For each of the 17 outcomes, the subject
follows her assigned rule with probability 1 − ε, and uniformly randomizes over the three options
with probability ε, where ε is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. (iii) Decision errors are independent
across preference profiles.44 (iv) When a rule is irresolute, the subject randomizes uniformly over
the prescribed choices.45 We assign each subject the rule R∗ and noise level ε∗ that maximize this
posterior probability, P (R, ε|c), where c is their choice vector.46 When more than one rule maximizes
the Bayesian posterior, we assign the subject to a maximizing rule at random.
When limiting consideration to consequential choices, irresolute rules have a built-in advantage:
their predictions more easily encompass actual choices. Our first procedure creates a countervail-
ing disadvantage: irresolute rules receive less “credit” (in terms of the increment to the posterior
probability) than resolute rules when both turn out to be consistent with a given choice.47
The second Bayes classification procedure employs subjects’ indifference statements along with
their consequential choices. The data for each subject then consists of 17 subsets of optimal options,
one for each preference profile. We continue to impose assumptions (i) and (iii), along with a slightly
modified version of assumption (ii) (when deviating from her rule, the subject randomizes uniformly
over the seven subsets of options, rather than the three options). Under these assumptions, a rule
43Simulations show that maximum-likelihood approaches perform poorly, in large part because they exhibit extreme
bias towards less resolute rules in our setting. In contrast, the Bayes classifier performs well in simulations (see Appendix
B.2).
44With this type of independence assumption, the method is sometimes called the Näıve Bayes Classifier.
45Because our displays present alternatives and workers in random order (redrawn in each round), even positional
criteria (such as always choosing the option on the left) will yield uniform distributions.
46See Appendix B.1 for the explicit derivation of P (R, ε|c). This procedure is known as the Maximum A Posteriori
(MAP) decision rule. The robustness of Bayesian classifiers has been documented extensively (see, e.g., Webb, 2010).
47This observation reflects the more general principle of the Bayesian Occam’s Razor (see MacKay, 2003).
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maximizes the posterior probability if and only if it maximizes the number of profiles for which it
predicts the correct subset. As with our first procedure, we break ties at random.
The two procedures complement each other. On the one hand, restricting attention to conse-
quential choices may yield more reliable results. On the other hand, the indifference data provide
pertinent information, particularly inasmuch as the average Social Planner expresses irresoluteness
for 18.01% of the profiles (just over 3 of 17).48 Information on indifference also allow us to dispense
with assumption (iv).
We pre-specify the 22 benevolent social choice rules discussed in Section 2.2. We also include a
malevolent versions each rule by inverting each Stakeholder’s preference ranking before applying the
rule. Accordingly, we consider a total of 44 possible aggregation rules.
For our first classification procedure, we absorb the following three scoring rules into neighboring
intervals: s = 35 , s =
4
5 , and s = 1; we do the same with their malevolent counterparts. The reason
is that we cannot separately identify these rules without using information on indifference. As shown
in Figure 2, each differs from nearby scoring rules on exactly one profile. Moreover, for the single
differentiating profile, each prescribes the union of the options selected when the scoring parameter is
slightly larger, and when it is slightly smaller. Because our first procedure always favors resoluteness
over irresoluteness when both possibilities are consistent with the same observation, it will never select
s ∈ { 35 ,
4
5 , 1} over all nearby scoring rules. In contrast, because there are two profiles for which the
scoring rule with s = 13 is irresolute while its neighbors are resolute, that rule can rationalize certain






Figure 7 displays our main classification results. Panel A, which relies on incentivized choices alone, is
strikingly similar to Panel B, which also incorporates indifference data. The following salient features
merit emphasis.
First, the two most common aggregation methods are the Borda rule and the near-antiplurality
rule (with 4/5 < s < 1). Together, these rules account for 30 to 40 percent of all subjects, depending
on the classification procedure.
Second a clear majority of all subjects (62.5% in Panel A, and 61.5% in Panel B) follow strictly
concave scoring rules with 12 < s ≤ 1. In contrast, strictly convex scoring rules (s <
1
2 ) are unpopular.
Surprisingly few subjects follow plurality rule (1% in Panel A, and 0.25% in Panel B.)
Third, fewer than 5% of subjects choose consistently with the Condorcet rule, and virtually no
subjects follow other p-supermajority rules (supermajority and unanimity). A small minority follow
scoring runoff rules (4.7% in Panel A and 7.2% in Panel B).
48In comparison, the set of our benevolent pre-specified rules produce a tie for 23.8% of the profiles, on average.
Focusing only on the Condorcet rule and the set of all scoring rules we can identify, this figure falls to 14.3%. Social
Planners designate all options as equally good for only 1.54% of profiles.
25
Because our pre-specified rules contain only one Condorcet extension (top cycle), these classifi-
cations could in principle understate the prevalence of rules in the Condorcet class. We therefore
enlarge the set of pre-specified rules to include all conceivable Condorcet extensions, and reclassify
subjects using our first procedure.49 We find that 10.6% of subjects use a Condorcet extension, a
modest increase, some of which would occur by chance.50 It is unlikely that the low prevalence of
Condorcet reasoning is a statistical or experimental artifact, because the Condorcet rule coincides on
a large number of profiles with convex scoring rules, which are also unpopular. We provide further
corroboration of this finding based on four-option problems in section 4.4.
Fourth, we see little if any evidence that subjects are either malevolent or lazy. The fraction of
subjects assigned to malevolent rules is de minimis. Lazy subjects would be inclined to select the
most easily implementable rule. Plurality rule is arguably the least cognitively demanding alterna-
tive, followed by plurality runoff, yet the vast majority of subjects evidently find both of these rules
unappealing. As we have noted, most subjects employ strictly concave scoring rules which, with the
exception of antiplurality, require more nuanced and complex judgments.
We obtain similar results for each method of presenting preference profiles. The only notable
difference across display formats is that Borda is more common than near-antiplurality with the first
and third display formats, while the opposite is true for the second display format; furthermore, this
difference is larger when we use the indifference data (see Appendix C.1).
Random benchmark We draw statistical inferences by comparing our classification to a random-
choice benchmark. We construct the benchmark by generating 4,000 artificial subjects whose simu-
lated selections for each profile are uniformly distributed across options. We generate indifference data
by designating each of the unchosen options as equally good based on independent Bernoulli draws.
We choose the Bernoulli probability to match the average size of the best-option sets according to
the actual subjects. We then assign each simulated subject to a pre-specified social choice rule using
both of our procedures. We construct the distribution of subjects assigned to each rule under the null
hypothesis of random choice by drawing 1,000 bootstrap samples of 405 simulated subjects each.
Figure 7 plots, for each rule, the mean fraction of simulated subjects assigned to that rule, as well
as the 1st and 99th percentiles of the corresponding distribution. The average fractions of simulated
subjects assigned to a malevolent rule is 50.4% in panel A and 40.9% in panel B, which exceed the
ranges of the figures.51 Turning to benevolent rules, in panel A we see that the fraction of subjects
49Because Condorcet winners fail to exist for two of the 17 profiles, there are only nine resolute Condorcet extensions.
As long as we include all of them, there is no need to add any irresolute Condorcet extensions, because our first procedure
never assigns a subject to a less resolute rule that is equally consistent with the subject’s choices (Bayesian Occam’s
Razor).
50The incremental subjects assigned to a Condorcet extension were originally assigned to a heterogeneous set of rules.
51Because our selection of profiles is not random, these benchmarks can deviate from 50%. To see this point, consider
the example of profile 1. Only the choice of the rank-dominated alternative B is consistent with a malevolent scoring
rule. Hence, one third of uniformly random choices would be classified as consistent with a malevolent scoring rule
based on that profile alone. The same argument applies to each of our score-identifying profiles. These constitute a
larger fraction of all profiles in the political domain than in the work domain.
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Figure 7: Best fitting pre-specified rules





































































































































































1st to 99th percentile, benchmark




















































































































































































1st to 99th percentile, benchmark
Notes: Both panels show the frequency of subjects classified as following each pre-specified rule (blue bars). Each red
dot indicates the fraction of 4,000 simulated subjects who randomize uniformly that the pertinent method classifies as
a particular pre-specified type. From that sample of 4,000 simulated subjects, we draw 1,000 bootstrap samples of 405
subjects each to a construct a distribution of classifications. The red lines extend from the 1st to the 99th percentiles of
that distribution. The random-choice benchmark for malevolent rules is not visible as it exceeds the range of the graph
(50.4% and 40.9% in the work and political domains, respectively) .
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assigned to every weakly concave scoring rule except 34 < s <
4
5 exceeds the 99th percentile of the
random benchmark. In contrast, the fractions of subjects assigned to the two most convex scoring
rules (s < 13 ) fall short of the 1st percentile of the random benchmark. While the fraction of subjects
assigned to the Condorcet rule is small, it is larger than we would observe by chance, a conclusion
for which we find corroboration in Section 4.4. Finally, scoring runoff rules, supermajority, and
unanimity are no more prevalent (and in some cases significantly less prevalent) than for the random-
choice benchmark. Similar conclusions generally follow from panel B, with the qualification that the
random-choice simulations assign lower frequencies to scoring rules that coincide with the boundaries
of distinguishable intervals.
Because our two classification procedures yield such similar results, for the sake of brevity we focus
on the first procedure in subsequent sections.
Goodness of fit The average value of the estimated noise parameter ε∗ provides a formal goodness-
of-fit measure. Using incentivized choices alone, we obtain a mean noise parameter of 0.10, which
signifies that the average subject chose randomly in just 1.7 of the 17 preference profiles. A whopping
42.0% of our subjects fit their assigned rule perfectly. For the remainder, the mean noise parameter is
0.16, equivalent to choosing randomly for 2.7 of the 17 preference profiles.52 In contrast, the average
estimated noise parameter for our simulated random-choice data is 0.46, and 0.57 when excluding
simulated subjects classified as Supermajority or Unanimity (10 of 17 profiles).53 When we use the
indifference data, subjects’ responses match the sets of options selected by their assigned rule for 14
of 17 profiles (85%). In contrast, for our random-choice benchmark, the corresponding number is
44%.54 The fact that actual choices fit the rules dramatically better than random-choice simulations
also indicates that the vast majority of our subjects paid attention and chose thoughtfully.
A more detailed picture of goodness of fit emerges from comparisons between the theoretical
fingerprints associated with particular rules and the empirical fingerprints of the subjects assigned
to those rules. The top half of Figure 8, panel A, plots the distribution of choices, by profile, for
subjects classified as using the Borda rule. The bottom half of the same panel shows the Borda
prescriptions. The fit is plainly tight. The highest choice frequency for any Borda-proscribed option
is 16% (profile 6, option B). The second highest is 8% (profile 1, option C). The frequencies of all
other Borda-proscribed options are at most 5%. While these subjects rarely depart from the Borda
52Appendix C.2 shows classifications of subjects based on the incentivized data split according to whether they fit
their assigned rules perfectly or imperfectly. While the distributions are generally similar, Borda is more prevalent
relative to near-antiplurality for perfectly fitting subjects. This pattern is mechanical: because Borda is less resolute
than near-antiplurality, it has more scope for matching choice patterns perfectly.
53The mean estimated noise parameter in the random-choice data never equals its actual value (unity) because some
random-choice sequences will always match some choice rules relatively well. The downward bias in the estimates of ε
reflects overfitting.
54Alternatively, one can think of an empirical fingerprint as consisting of 3× 17 = 51 binary variables, each of which
indicates whether a given option is selected for a given profile. The average subject’s choice coincides with the prediction
of the best-fitting rule in 47 of these 51 cases (92%), which is far higher than the random-choice benchmark (65.9%).
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Figure 8: Empirical fingerprints of classified subjects
A. Subjects classified as Borda
Empirical Choices
A 92 99 66 44 0 0 1 0 95 5 0 0 49 0 1 0 0
B 0 0 0 56 60 16 5 5 0 0 3 2 27 66 99 98 100
C 8 1 34 0 40 84 94 95 5 95 97 98 24 34 0 2 0
Rule prediction
A 100 100 50 50 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 50 100 100 100
C 0 0 50 0 50 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 33 50 0 0 0
B. Subjects classified as near-antiplurality
Empirical Choices
A 95 100 9 85 1 0 0 0 32 85 0 0 97 1 9 0 0
B 0 0 0 15 98 100 84 87 5 0 100 3 2 59 90 100 100
C 5 0 91 0 1 0 16 13 63 15 0 97 1 40 1 0 0
Rule prediction
A 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 0 0 50 100 100 100
C 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 50 0 0 0
Notes: In both panels, the top half displays the choices by subjects assigned to a certain rule. The bottom half displays
the choices the rule predicts. The figures pertain to the classification procedure that does not use indifferent data.
Darker shades of grey indicate higher frequencies. The numerical percentage appears within each shaded cell. For the
theoretical rule, we take the frequency of each best option to be 50% for a two-way tie and 33% for a three-way tie.
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rule, they do deviate somewhat from uniform resolution of ties (see, for example, profiles 3 and 14,
where the proportions are one-third/two-thirds rather than half-half).
Panel B of Figure 8 provides analogous information for the near-antiplurality rule, which differs
from Borda on 10 of the 17 profiles. The fit is also good, if slightly less tight. The highest choice
frequency for any antiplurality-proscribed option is 32% (profile 9, option A). These subjects select
four other proscribed options with frequencies ranging between 13% and 16% (see profiles 4, 7, 8, and
10), but they select each of the remaining 28 proscribed options with frequencies of 5% or less.
Overall, the 22 pre-specified benevolent social choice rules fit the data remarkably well given that
there are more than 232 trillion (717) possible rules for this restricted set of 17 profiles, of which
more than 18 trillion (714 × 33) are “reasonable” in the sense that they exhibit no Pareto violations.
To further allay possible concerns about overfitting, we show in subsection 4.5 that our classification
predicts well out of sample.
4.3 Is the classification complete?
To determine whether our classification analysis excludes empirically important rules, we look for
clusters of subjects whose choices more closely resemble each others’ than any of the pre-specified
possibilities. Our approach is similar to that of Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).
To identify clusters, we use the k-modes clustering algorithm, which is an adaptation of the well-
known k-means method to categorical data (Huang, 1998). The algorithm begins by arbitrarily
selecting k subjects as initial cluster centers. Then it iterates two steps. First, each subject is
assigned to the cluster for which the center matches her choices on the largest number of preference
profiles. Second, cluster centers are updated: the new cluster center consists of the modal choice for
subjects assigned to that cluster.55 The algorithm terminates once the cluster centers stabilize. We
use our pre-specified rules to create additional potential cluster modes that appear in all iterations.
Because we do not use the indifference data for this exercise, we include every resolute version of each
pre-specified rule. Following Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), if a subject is equidistant from a
pre-specified rule and an endogenous cluster, we assign them to the pre-specified rule.
We search for clusters in the work domain fixing k = 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10. For k = 1, we run the
algorithm 405 times, using each subject’s choices as an initial cluster center once. For k ≥ 2, we run
the algorithm 1000 times, in each case randomly setting the initial cluster centers equal to the choices
of k randomly selected subjects (excluding those who perfectly conform to pre-specified rules), and
retaining the solution with the lowest total within-cluster distance.56 We limit the pre-specified rules
to all scoring rules and all Condorcet extensions, which have a total of 296 resolute components. We
exclude unanimity because the resolute components (of which there are 23×314 > 38×106) encompass
all choice patterns that are consistent with the Pareto principle. Similarly, we exclude supermajority
55In our setting, the modal choice is a vector specifying the most common selection for each preference profile.
56We use the Hamming distance, i.e. the number of profiles on which two choice sequences differ from each other.
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because it is massively irresolute, so the number of resolute components is enormous. These exclusions
are likely inconsequential given the small number of subjects assigned to these rules in section 4.2, and
in any case the exclusion of an empirically important rule can only increase the fraction of subjects
assigned to endogenous clusters. Other exclusions are attributable to redundancies.57
Table 5 displays the resulting endogenous clusters and the fractions of subjects assigned to each
of them. For k = 1, just under 5% (19 of 405) of subjects are assigned to an endogenous cluster.
For k = 2, the same cluster emerges plus a second that attracts under 2% of subjects (7 of 405). As
we increase k further, these same two clusters remain, and the others encompass even fewer subjects.
For k = 10, the smallest three clusters are degenerate (1 subject), indicating that we can find no
other consequential similarities. Notably, the rule for the largest cluster is a one-profile deviation
from near-antiplurality, from which it departs on profile 9 by selecting option A rather than C. We
note that this is the only profile for which near-antiplurality selects an option ranked last by some
Stakeholder, and not ranked first by any other Stakeholder.
4.4 Corroboration based on four-option social choice problems
Four-option profiles provide additional opportunities to distinguish cleanly between classes of social
choice rules. Specifically, there are two four-option profiles, labeled “Condorcet-separating 1” and
“Condorcet-separating 2” in Table 3 (numbered 18 and 19), for which the Condorcet winner is rank-
dominated. These profiles distinguish between all Condorcet extensions and the entire class of proper
scoring rules (ones that do not assign the same score to any two ranks) because the former must select
the Condorcet winner while the latter cannot select a rank-dominated option.
We randomly intermingle both of these profiles with the three-option profiles in both domain
blocks. While four-option problems are more cognitively demanding, recall that the experimental
interface allows subjects to hide options, which makes it easy to identify Condorcet winners.
As shown in the left half of Table 4 (which pertains to the work domain), subjects choose the
Condorcet winner roughly one-fifth of the time for each of these profiles. However, only 11.6% con-
sistently choose the Condorcet winner for both profiles.58 In contrast, because a negligible fraction of
subjects choose option D, roughly 80% of the individual choices are consistent with a proper scoring
rule. Moreover, for 69.6% of subjects, the pair of choices is consistent with some scoring rule in the
following class: [1, s1, s2, 0] where s1 = (2/3)
γ , s2 = (1/3)
γ , and γ ∈ [0,∞].59
In interpreting the preceding results, it is important to bear in mind that rules outside the Con-
dorcet class can rationalize the selection of option A for profiles 18 and 19. As indicated in Table
3, plurality rule (s1 = s2 = 0) prescribes options A and B, while the plurality runoff rule prescribes
57For example, because plurality runoff always selects a plurality winner, the resolute components of the latter rule
contain those of the former.
58This frequency, while relatively small, is significantly higher than would be observed by chance if the distributions
of choices were independent across profiles, 0.205× 0.212 = 0.043 (χ2-test, p < 0.001).
59This class of rules is consistent with choosing B for both profiles, choosing C for both profiles, and (for a threshold
value of γ) choosing B in one and C in the other.
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Table 3: Four-alternative profiles.
Label Index Profile Option selected Condorcet Plurality
by some proper (* = runoff)
scoring rule
Condorcet-separating 1 18 A A B B C B or C A {A∗,B}
B B A C D
C C C D A
D D D A B
Condorcet-separating 2 19 A A B B C B or C A {A∗,B}
B B A D D
C C C C A
D D D A B
Runoff-separating 1 22 A A B D D A or B or C {A, B, C, D} {A,D∗}
B B C A C
C C D C B
D D A B A
Runoff-separating 2 23 A A C D D A or B or C {A, B, C, D} {A,D∗}
B B B A B
C C D C C
D D A B A
Notes: Each preference profile is displayed as a 4×5-matrix; columns correspond to workers, rows correspond to
preference ranks. A worker’s r-ranked alternative is listed in the rth row. For Condorcet-cyclical profiles, we indicate
the set of options in the top-cycle.
Table 4: Choices on class-separating profiles
Domain Work Politics
Option A B C D A B C D
Condorcet winner X X
Optimal for some scoring rule X X X X
Condorcet-separating 1 0.205 0.694 0.099 0.002 0.188 0.746 0.064 0.002
Condorcet-separating 2 0.212 0.719 0.064 0.005 0.188 0.800 0.012 0.000
Consistent Condorcet 0.116 0.111
Consistent Scoring 0.696 0.733
Option A B C D A B C D
Plurality-runoff winner X X
Optimal for some scoring rule X X X X X X
Runoff-separating 1 0.257 0.385 0.314 0.044 0.353 0.405 0.188 0.054
Runoff-separating 2 0.202 0.615 0.141 0.042 0.259 0.643 0.042 0.056
Consistent Runoff 0.012 0.028
Consistent Scoring 0.884 0.930
Notes: This table displays the fraction of subjects choosing each of the four options in each of the class-separating
profiles. The first 262 subjects were not presented with the profile labelled Runoff-separating 2 in the political domain.
The fraction of subjects consistently choosing in accordance with the plurality runoff rule in that domain is based on
the remaining subjects.
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Table 5: Clustering results
Profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Condorcet C A A B C C C C A C C ABCABC B B B B
Scoring
s̄ 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/5 2/3 2/3 3/4 3/4 4/5 - 1/2 0 0 0 0
s < s̄ C Ba) A B C C C C A C C Ca) BC - - - -
s > s̄ A A C A B B B B C A B C A BC Bb) B B
Endogenous clusters, k = 1
% subjects
4.69 A A C A B B B B A A B C A B B B B
Total: 4.69
Endogenous clusters, k = 2
% subjects
4.69 A A C A B B B B A A B C A B B B B
1.73 A A C B B B C B C C B C A C B B B
Total: 6.42
Endogenous clusters, k = 3
% subjects
4.69 A A C A B B B B A A B C A B B B B
1.73 A A C B B B C B C C B C A C B B B
0.25 A A C A A A B A B A A B A A C B A
Total: 6.67
Endogenous clusters, k = 5
% subjects
4.69 A A C A B B B B A A B C A B B B B
1.73 A A C A B B B B A A B C A C B B B
1.73 A A C B B B C B C C B C A C B B B
1.48 A A A B B B B C A C C C A C B B B
0.74 A A A A B B B C B A B C A A C B B
Total: 10.37
Endogenous clusters, k = 10
% subjects
4.69 A A C A B B B B A A B C A B B B B
1.73 A A C B B B C B C C B C A C B B B
1.48 A A A B B B B C A C C C A B B B B
1.23 A A A B B B C C A C C C A B B B B
0.99 A A C A B B C C C C C C A C B B B
0.74 A A C A B B C B A C C C C B B B B
0.74 A A C A B B B C C C B C A B B B B
0.25 A A C A A A B A B A A B A A C B A
0.25 B C B B A B C C C B A A B A C A B
0.25 A C A B C C B B A A B C A B C C B
Total: 12.35
Notes: This table shows the clusters which endogenously emerge in addition to our pre-specified rules from application
of a k-modes algorithm, along with the fractions of subjects assigned to each such cluster. For ease of comparison, the
top section of the table shows the choices of selected pre-specified rules.
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A. Antiplurality rule (s1 = s2 = 1) also prescribes either A or B. One way to distinguish between
Condorcet and plurality runoff on the one hand, and plurality and antiplurality on the other, is to
examine the indifference data. Of those who select A for both profiles, 36.2% rate B as equally good,
which suggests that more than a third of these selections reflect either plurality or antiplurality rule.
It is also noteworthy that only 51.1% of these same subjects choose option C for profile 1 (consistent
with both Condorcet and plurality rule), and also choose A, the Condorcet winner, rather than B or
C, the plurality winners, for profile 2. Accordingly, choices for our four-option profiles imply that the
fraction of subjects who implicitly follow some Condorcet rule in the work domain is on the order of
6% to 7%, which is consistent with our findings for three-option problems.
Profiles 22 and 23 in Table 3, which we also intermingled with the three-option profiles, leverage
the principle of rank-dominance to provide clean separation between proper scoring rules and the
plurality runoff rule. As shown in the left half of Table 4, subjects choose option D, the plurality
runoff winner, roughly 5% of the time. Only 1.2% of subjects choose D for both profiles,60 whereas
88.4% of subjects behave as if both choices reflect a single proper scoring rule from the family specified
above.61 Accordingly, only a small fraction of the Condorcet-consistent behavior for profiles 18 and
19 is likely attributable to use of the plurality runoff rule.
Four-option profiles such as 22 and 23 also enable more nuanced distinctions among rules. For
example, they can provide a foundation for distinguishing concave scoring from a general aversion to
lowest ranks; see Appendix C.3.
4.5 Contextual judgments or structural aggregation principles?
Next we investigate the extent to which our classification captures subjects’ structural aggregation
principles, as opposed to contextual judgments.
To the extent we have uncovered subjects’ structural aggregation principles, we would expect our
classifications to be stable across the work and political domains. Recall that, for the latter, we
present subjects with a smaller number of preference profiles (7 instead of 17). While we can still
identify scoring rules for which the parameter falls within the same intervals as before, we can no
longer separately identify rules for which it lies at the boundaries of those intervals (i.e., points in
C).62 Moreover, the fingerprints of scoring rules with s ≤ 13 (including plurality rule), the Condorcet
rule, and all scoring runoff rules with s < 1 coincide for these seven profiles. For our current purposes,
we will call this group the “plurality-equivalent rules.”
60Though small, this fraction is significantly higher than would be observed by chance if the distributions of choices
were independent across profiles (χ2-test, p < 0.001).
61For these two profiles, every combination of choices in {A,B,C} is consistent with some scoring rule, except that a
choice of option C in profile 23 implies γ ≥ 0.69, and, accordingly, that C is also the best choice for profile 22.
62As explained in Section 4.2, consequential choice data can identify such scoring rules only if the two nearby scoring
rules s + ε and s − ε differ on at least two preference profiles. Appendix A.2 shows the distance between all pairs of
pre-specified rules in the political domain.
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Notes: Classifications are based only on consequential choices, and on the same set of seven preference profiles for both
domains. The category ‘plurality equivalent’ includes scoring rules with s ≤ 1/3, the Condorcet rule, and all scoring
runoff rules with s < 1.
Figure 9 shows the differences in the resulting distributions of classifications for the work and
political domains. Here we rely only on consequential choices, and we reclassify subjects in the work
domain based on the same seven preference profiles to ensure comparability. Systematic differences
are immediately apparent. Within the political domain, subjects are less likely to use strictly concave
scoring rules, especially 45 < s ≤ 1, and are more likely to use either the Borda rule or a plurality-
equivalent rule. The difference is highly statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p <
0.01).63 It bears emphasis, however, that these differences are of limited magnitude. The increase in
the frequency of plurality-equivalent rules is on the order of 6%, and the decrease in the frequency of
all strictly concave rules is 13.6%.
Even if aggregation rules are not completely stable across domains, they may still capture stable
tendencies that reflect underlying structure. Notably, results for the four-option class-separating
profiles in Table 4 exhibit strikingly little domain sensitivity.64 It follows that people are generally
attracted to scoring rules and generally averse to majoritarian criteria.
To evaluate the stability of aggregation preferences more comprehensively, we examine the out-of-
sample and cross-domain predictive power of our classifications. For each evaluation, we designate a
training set of preference profiles which we use to classify Social Planners based on their consequential
choices, as well as a test set which we use to evaluate predictive success. We score predictions as
follows. If the actual choice lies outside the predicted best-choice set, the score is zero. If it lies within
63We apply the test to the 400 (out of 405) subjects who are classified as following a scoring rule or a plurality-
equivalent rule in both domains.
64While all subjects saw profile 23 in the work domain, only those in Sessions 8 - 11 saw it in the political domain.
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the predicted best-choice set, the score is 1, 12 , or
1
3 depending on whether there are 1, 2, or 3 best
options. With this scoring system, if underlying choices are in fact uniformly random, the average
score will be 13 irrespective of the sizes of predicted best-choice sets. Averaging this score across all
profiles in the test set, we obtain a measure of predictive accuracy that lies between 0 and 1.
We conduct four separate evaluations, two involving within-domain predictions, and two involving
cross-domain predictions. For the within-domain predictions, we use leave-one-out-cross-validation
(LOOCV): we designate one preference profile in the pertinent domain as the test set and use the
other same-domain profiles as the training set. We repeat using each profile as the test set and
average the predictive scores. For cross-domain predictions, we designate all profiles in one domain as
the training set and all profiles in the other domain as the test set. Thus, the training set for the work
domain consists of either 16 (within-domain) or 17 (cross-domain) profiles, while the training set for
the political domain consists of either 6 (within-domain) or 7 (cross-domain) profiles.65 Because of
these differences, caution is warranted when comparing the various predictions to each other rather
than to benchmarks.
As shown in Table 6, the average predictive accuracy scores for our four evaluations range from
0.758 (work to politics) to 0.853 (work to work). In all four cases, predictive performance is far
superior to the random-choice benchmark (expected score of 13 ).
Next we quantify the improvement in predictive performance that results from making appropriate
assignments of subjects to pre-specified rules, rather than merely from pre-specifying a set of rules that
generally coincide with reasonable tendencies. To this end, we offer three alternative benchmarks. For
the first, we make predictions based on a uniform random assignment of each subject to one of the 44
pre-specified rules. The second benchmark is identical, except that we restrict these assignments to the
22 benevolent rules. The third refines the second by randomizing based on the estimated distribution
of subjects across rules, rather than uniformly. There are two versions of the third benchmark, which
differ according to whether we use the estimated distribution for the work domain or the political
domain. In each case, we perform the procedure using 1000 bootstrap draws of our sample, and
report both the mean and the 99th percentile of the resulting score.
For all four evaluations and all benchmarks, the average predictive accuracy score exceeds the
99th percentile of the benchmark’s distribution by a wide margin. To be sure, merely pre-specifying
a set of rules that generally coincide with reasonable tendencies accounts for a sizable portion of
the improvement in predictive accuracy relative to the random-choice benchmark. However, the
gain from making appropriate assignments of individual subjects to specific rules is considerable. To
illustrate, focus on the most demanding benchmark for the work domain (3a), for which the mean
benchmark score is 0.762. If all of our individual-level assignments were correct, we would obtain
a score of 0.921. This number represents the theoretical maximum for the average score, given the
65For the purpose of predicting from the political domain to the work domain, when the worker’s classification
encompasses more than one of the 22 pre-specified rules (such as the plurality-equivalent rules), we select one of them
at random.
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Table 6: Out-of-sample predictive power of the Bayesian classification
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Fraction of correct predictions
(weighted by resoluteness)






1. Uniform, all prespecified rules
Mean 0.445 0.398
99th percentile 0.485 0.440
2. Uniform, non-malevolent prespecified rules
Mean 0.720 0.651
99th percentile 0.744 0.686
3.a Estimated rule frequencies, work domain
Mean 0.762 0.653
99th percentile 0.779 0.680
3.b Estimated rule frequencies, political domain
Mean 0.696 0.625
99th percentile 0.716 0.652
Notes: Within-domain predictions are based on leave-out-one cross-validation.
overall distribution of pre-specified rules; it is less than 1.0 because the rules are partially irresolute.
An average score of 0.853 therefore implies that the individual-level assignments achieve 57% (i.e.,
(0.853− 0.762)/(0.921− 0.762)) of the maximum possible gain in predictive accuracy over a baseline
that randomly scrambles those assignments.
Based on the strong out-of-sample predictive performance of our classifications, we conclude that
assigned rules capture the essence of subjects’ actual aggregation criteria. While the shift in the
distributions of selections between the two domains points to a degree of context-specificity, the
accuracy of the cross-domain predictions reassures us that ordinal aggregation also entails stable
structural elements.
4.6 Do Social Planners make cardinal inferences?
Why are scoring rules so popular? One possibility is that people are comfortable with the concept of
cardinal utility, so they use the ordinal information they receive to make cardinal inferences before
aggregating and making a selection (in the spirit of Apesteguia et al., 2011). This hypothesis is
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consistent with the context-sensitivity of scoring rules documented in section 4.5, but that finding
may have other explanations. In this section, we provide additional evidence that corroborates the
cardinal inference hypothesis.
Informational interventions Suppose a decision maker chooses option A from the set {A,B,C}.
According to the choice axiom known as Sen’s α, if we remove option C from the opportunity set,
the chooser will still select A. In the current context, there are two distinct ways to remove C:
we can continue to inform the Social Planner about the Stakeholders’ rankings of all three options
even though C is no longer available (variant 1), or we can limit this information to the rankings
of A and B (variant 2). Imagine that, in the original problem, the Social Planner makes cardinal
inferences about the attractiveness of options A and B from their rankings relative to C and applies
a Samuelson-Bergson social welfare function. In variant 1, that information remains available, so the
Planner should respect Sen’s α. However, in variant 2, that information is no longer available, so
depending on the rankings, we should see violations of Sen’s α.66
Each column of Table 7 provides a separate test of the cardinal-inference hypothesis based on this
design. For column (1), the “Baseline” profile (part A) consists of three alternatives. Option C is
obviously inferior, and is almost never chosen. For the “Option removed, rank information retained”
profile (part B), we remove option C from the menu but continue to display rankings that include
it. Choice frequencies are similar and the differences are statistically insignificant, so we do not
reject Sen’s α. For the “Option and rank information removed” profile (part C) we remove option
C from the menu and from the Stakeholders’ rankings. Choice frequencies change dramatically, and
we resoundingly reject Sen’s α. The natural explanation is that Stakeholders generally regard C as a
bad option. The fact that one of them thinks B is worse than C, whereas none think A is worse than
C, leads most Social Planners to choose A over B. But when that information is removed, nearly all
Social Planners select B based on the majority preference relationship.
Results for the other two columns in Table 7 are qualitatively similar. In column (2), where we
remove option A from a three-alternative profile, we reject Sen’s α even when information about the
rankings of A remains available, but the choice frequencies do not change dramatically, especially
compared with the outcome when we also remove A from the rankings. In column (3), where we
remove option D from a four-option profile, the choice frequencies barely change when information
about the rankings of D remain available, but change dramatically when they are unavailable.
Synthetic money-metric scoring parameters While the preceding findings are generally con-
sistent with the cardinal-inference hypothesis, they do not explicitly document reliance on cardinal
information. The next part of our analysis fills that gap. On the assumption that Social Planners
66The hypothesized failure of Sen’s α would suggest a corresponding failure of Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA): if withholding information on the ranking of an unavailable option affects choice, then presumably
changing its ranking will do likewise.
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A A B B B
B C A A A
C B C C C
A C C C B
B B B B A
C A A A C
A A B B C
B B A C D
C C C D A
D D D A B




A B C D
0.205 0.694 0.099 0.002
B. Option removed, rank information retained
Profiles
A A B B B
B C A A A
C B C C C
A C C C B
B B B B A
C A A A C
A A B B C
B B A C D
C C C D A
D D D A B






C. Option and rank information removed
Profiles
A A B B B
B B A A A
B C C C B
C B B B C
A A B B C
B B A C A
C C C A B







A vs. B 0.531 0.007 1.000
B vs. C 0.000 0.000 0.000
A vs. C 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The profile in column 1 of Panel C is profile 14 of Table 1. In Panel A, the profile in column 3 is profile 18
from Table 3, and the profiles in the first and second columns are profiles 4 and 5 from Table 1, respectively. Columns
1 and 2 of Panel C both display the distribution of choices that subjects made for the single two-alternative profile they
encountered. All decisions concern the work domain. p-values are based on two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for
equality of distributions.
are money-metric utilitarians, we use their stated beliefs about Stakeholders’ reservation valuations
for first-ranked, second-ranked, and third-ranked options to construct synthetic money-metric scoring
parameters. We then ask whether the scoring parameters that rationalize actual choices are related
to these synthetic utilitarian versions.
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Formally, let ui,dr denote Social Planner i’s belief about the average Stakeholder’s reservation
valuation for his r-ranked alternative, for rank r ∈ {1, 2, 3} and domain d ∈{work, politics}.67 The









We examine the relation between the synthetic utilitarian scoring parameter s̃ and subjects’ actual
best-fitting scoring parameter s. In the work domain, we exclude 9 subjects who say they believe the
average reservation wage is lower for the second-ranked option than for the first-ranked option, or
lower for the third-ranked option than for the second-ranked option, on the grounds that they are
likely inattentive or confused; in the political domain we drop 6 subjects. Thus, s̃d ∈ [0, 1]. To avoid
selection effects, we assign all subjects to their best-fitting scoring rules. We use OLS regression, using
interval midpoints whenever best-fit scoring parameters are interval-identified. All regressions include
fixed effects for preference profile presentation modes and for the order in which the subject made
decisions about the work domain and the political domain.
The regression in Column 1 of Table 8 pools observations across the work and political domains. It
includes a dummy variable for domain and clusters standard errors on the subject level. The coefficient
of the synthetic scoring rule is positive and statistically significant. It remains positive when we run
the regression separately for the two domains, but it is statistically significant only for the political
domain. A potential explanation for this difference is that we measure the synthetic scoring parameter
with less noise in the political domain because subjects are more familiar with political attitudes than
with inclinations to perform various tasks, and consequently there is less attenuation of the coefficient.
Columns 4 to 6 add controls for Social Planners’ risk attitudes and altruism, both measured as
the percentile rank of the subject’s average switching point for the two pertinent multiple decision
lists. The coefficient of risk aversion is positive, as one would expect if Social Planners maximize the
expected utility of a Stakeholder assessed behind a “veil of ignorance” concerning which Stakeholder
has which ranking (in which case greater risk aversion implies greater concavity of the scoring rule),
but the effect is weak. We also find that more altruistic Social Planners tend to use more concave
scoring rules.
Next we ask whether the observed differences in scoring parameters across regimes is at least
partially attributable to differences in cardinal inferences. In Column 7, we regress the difference
between best-fit scoring rules across regimes for each subject on the corresponding difference between
the synthetic scoring rules. The coefficient of interest remains positive and statistically significant.
Indeed, this estimate closely resembles its counterparts in columns 1 and 4.
67We assume that the Social Planner’s inferences about positional money-metric utility do not vary from one profile
to another, and consequently elicit these beliefs only once.
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Table 8: Relation between best-fitting scoring parameters and beliefs about reservation prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLE Lower and upper bound
on estimated scoring parameter s
Domain
Work X X X X X
Politics X X X X X
Differenced (cross-domain) X
Scoring parameter s̃ 0.168** 0.104 0.210** 0.147** 0.080 0.193* 0.137**
implied by beliefs (0.067) (0.076) (0.104) (0.067) (0.077) (0.106) (0.069)
Risk aversion %-rank 0.063* 0.049 0.076
(0.033) (0.034) (0.047)
Altruism %-rank 0.080** 0.065* 0.094*
(0.035) (0.034) (0.051)
Political domain -0.133*** -0.134***
(0.012) (0.012)
Observations 795 396 399 795 396 399 390
Subjects 405 396 399 405 396 399 390
Notes: Parameters estimated with OLS using midpoint values of best-fit score. All regressions control for the type
of preference profile presentation and for whether the political domain was displayed before or after the work domain.
Regressions include all subjects with monotonic beliefs about reservation prices. Regressions include subjects with
multiple switches in the multiple decision lists used to elicit risk preferences and altruism. For these subjects we set the
corresponding variable to the mean of the values among the other subjects, and we include two indicator variables for
multiple switching points, one for each characteristic. Standard errors in columns 1 and 4 are clustered by subject.
Having shown that differences in cardinal inferences contribute to the observed differences in
scoring rules across regimes, we now provide evidence that subjects also attach domain-independent
weights to the various ordinal ranks. In other words, they appear to deploy a blend of cardinalism
and ordinalism. In Column 1 of Table 9, we use an OLS regression to measure the subject-level
correlation between synthetic scoring rules in the political domain and the work domain, conditional
on presentation mode and order. While we acknowledge that these measures are noisy and that noise
would attenuate the measured correlation, the absence of any correlation suggests that the true cardi-
nal inferences are unrelated across regimes. In Column 2, we use a similar regression to measure the
(conditional) subject-level correlation between best-fit scoring rules in the two domains. It is positive
and highly significant despite the apparent absence of any correlation in cardinal inferences. Thus,
best-fit scoring rules appear to reflect some common factor that is unrelated to cardinal inferences.
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Table 9: Relation between synthetic and best-fitting scoring parameters across domains.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Scoring parameter in political domain
Synthetic Best-fitting







Notes: OLS regressions. Both equations control for the type of preference profile presentation and for whether the
political domain was displayed before or after the work domain. Regressions include all subjects with monotonic beliefs
about reservation prices.
5 General population samples
In this section, we ask whether our main conclusions extend to general population samples. We also
test whether the general public in countries with divergent social and political traditions, the United
States and Sweden (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), use similar or divergent criteria when aggregating
ordinal preferences, and we explore external validity by asking whether ordinal aggregation criteria
among the general public are related to attitudes toward political processes. Our cross-cultural com-
parison can potentially help explain why different nations gravitate toward different types of policies.
As Alesina and Angeletos (2005) point out, policies may diverge either because different cultures have
fundamentally different preferences, or because of beliefs, historical accidents, institutions, and/or
equilibrium selection.
In these supplemental experiments, each social choice entails the allocation of $20 (in the U.S.)
or SEK170 (in Sweden) to one of four charities: Doctors without Borders, Unicef, Oxfam, and the
International Fund for Animal Welfare.68 These organizations are well known in both countries and
represent diverse causes that have broad appeal across the political spectrum. We recruited 712
Swedish and 805 U.S. voting-age citizens through Dynata and Lucid to serve as Social Planners. Each
Social Planner aggregates the preferences of same-country Stakeholders, recruited through pollfish.
All Social Planners see the same reduced set of profiles we used for the political domain in our main
experiment, as well as either the actual profile for a group of Stakeholders or a randomly generated
profile. Social Planners know that one of the preference profiles they consider corresponds to real
Stakeholders with 10% probability. We use abridged instructions that carefully explain the preference
68At the time of the study, these amounts were roughly equivalent according to market exchange rates ($1 ≈ SEK
8.50).
43
displays (see Appendix E.2). Subjects must pass an abbreviated comprehension check to participate.69
See Appendix D for additional implementation details and demographic summary statistics.
To make our samples more representative of the respective general populations, we weight obser-
vations as follows. For the US sample, we use the 2018 General Social Survey (Smith et al., 2019) to
generate weights for 16 population categories defined by (i) gender (male, female), (ii) race (white,
black, hispanic, other), and (iii) political party preference (Democrat, Republican). For the Swedish
sample, we use data from Statistics Sweden (2018) to generate weights for 12 categories defined by (i)
gender, and (ii) political party preference (Left Party, Social Democratic Party, Green Party, Centre
Party, Moderate Party, Sweden Democrats).70
Because these data require us to categorize subjects based on seven three-option profiles rather
than seventeen, it is important to bear in mind the following limitations. First, categorizations based
on fewer choices are more sensitive to one or two noisy selections. Second, because it is harder to detect
irresoluteness with fewer profiles when using only consequential choices, certain scoring rules such as
Borda are more difficult to distinguish from neighboring rules. Third, some rules become entirely
indistinguishable. In particular, the Condorcet rule, plurality rule, and plurality runoff all have the
same implications for the reduced set of three-option profiles. In light of the first two issues, we rely
on seven-profile classifications mainly to make comparisons across subject pools. The distributions
themselves should be taken with a grain of salt, as there are systematic differences between the seven-
and seventeen-profile classifications for our student population in the work domain.
In light of the third issue, we begin by discussing the four-option class-separating profiles, which
cleanly differentiate between proper scoring rules, Condorcet rules, and plurality runoff, as in Section
4.4 (recall Table 3). Only 8.0% of U.S. subjects and 5.8% of Swedish subjects consistently choose the
Condorcet winner for both Condorcet-separating profiles. Moreover, 24.4% (U.S.) and 14.6% (Sweden)
of those subjects express indifference between options for at least one of these profiles, which suggests
that they follow plurality rule. That leaves roughly 5% to 6% of subjects in the Condorcet category.
Likewise, small minorities (3.1% of US subjects and 1.7% of Swedish subjects) choose the plurality
runoff winner in both runoff-separating profiles. All of these results closely parallel our findings for
the student sample.
Next, using the Bayes classifier, we assign each subject to the best-fitting rule based on their
consequential choices for the seven three-option profiles. Figure 10 displays the results. To facilitate
comparisons across samples, we consolidate several categories (strictly concave scoring rules, all benev-
olent alternatives aside from scoring rules, and all malevolent rules). The figure shows classification
frequencies for the U.S. sample, the Swedish sample, and the Swiss student sample (political domain).
When comparing the results for the student sample to either of the general population samples, one
69Subjects recruited through Dynata could proceed in spite of failing the comprehension check. We exclude such
observations from our data.
70For both countries, these are the most recent data that include the requisite information for each combination of
characteristics.
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should bear in mind that the domains are similar but not identical. Because we have found that
aggregation rules vary somewhat across domains (Section 4.5), we would not expect the classifications
to match perfectly.





















































Notes: Bayes classifications based on consequential choices for the seven three-option preferences profiles indicated
with stars in Table 1. General population observations weighted to make the samples representative with respect to
gender, party preference, and race (US only).
Differences in classification frequencies between the Swedish and U.S. general population samples
are remarkably small and statistically insignificant. Hence, the fundamental aggregation preferences
of U.S. and Swedish citizens are extremely similar, which suggests that they do not contribute to
policy divergences. The general population distributions also resemble the distribution for the student
sample despite the difference in domains.71 Like the low prevalence of Condorcet rules (noted above),
the popularity of strictly concave scoring rules proves to be a robust phenomenon. Notably, the
elevated frequencies of “Other benevolent rules” are attributable primarily to the antiplurality runoff
rule, which is closely related to the strictly concave alternatives. The modestly higher frequencies of
malevolent rules suggest that our general population samples may include slightly higher fractions of
subjects who did not take the tasks seriously. Similarly, the slightly elevated use of plurality rule, the
least cognitively demanding alternative, could be attributable to greater laziness.
Finally, we ask whether our measures of aggregation preference correlate with self-reported atti-
tudes toward political processes. Our survey presents subjects with two hypothetical candidates for
71As expected, the Borda rule appears to be less popular when we classify fewer subjects based on seven profiles
rather than seventeen. When we also employ the indifference data to classify subjects based on seven profiles, Borda
frequencies increase substantially.
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political leadership of the nation. It describes Candidate 1 as polarizing: “Most citizens either love
him or hate him. There is hardly anyone who does not have a strong opinion. If candidate 1 were
elected, some citizens would be exhilarated, many others would be devastated, and nobody would be
indifferent.” We describe Candidate 2 as a compromise alternative: “While he is nobody’s greatest
favorite, most citizens would be ok with candidate 2. If he were elected, nobody would be exhilarated,
nobody would be devastated.”72 We ask subjects “Which candidate better represents the will of the
citizens of the nation?” In addition, subjects indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with
each of the following two statements: “The political system should strive for compromise solutions that
everyone can live with even if the result is nobody’s absolute favorite,” and “What the majority wants
is right for a country, even if that makes some citizens suffer.” We construct an index of preference
for compromise policies as follows: we assign values 0, 13 ,
2
3 , and 1 to the responses ‘strongly disagree’,
‘disagree’, ‘agree’, and ‘strongly agree’ for the first of these two questions, invert the scores for the
second, and average responses across them.
Table 10: Relation between behavioral measures of preference for compromise and self-reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Prefers compromise Prefers compromise
candidate solutions
Mean of the dep. var. 0.801 0.686
Scoring parameter 0.077* 0.070* 0.035 0.022
(0.042) (0.042) (0.056) (0.055)
Demographic controls X X
Subjects 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404
Notes: OLS regressions. All regressions control for sample provider and display fixed effects. Demographic controls
include nationality, gender, age, marital status, percentile rank of respondents’ education within the sample in their
respective country, indicators for being unemployed and for being part-time employed, as well as the percentile rank of
income within the sample for the respondents’ country.
Table 10 examines the relation between these self-reported attitudes and our behavioral measure
of aggregation preference. For Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of
the preference for the compromise candidate; in Columns 3 and 4, it is our measure of preference
for compromise policies. Each column reports an OLS regression pooling over U.S. and Swedish
subjects. The main independent variable is the subject’s scoring parameter, which we compute by
restricting the Bayes classification to scoring rules and assigning interval midpoints. In all cases,
we control for sample provider and display fixed effects. While the results are not strong, they are
nevertheless suggestive. As expected, those who deploy more concave scoring rules tend to prefer
72We randomize the order of the descriptions as well as the candidate labels.
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greater compromise in political processes. The relationship is significant at the 10% level in Columns
1 and 2, and statistically insignificant but directionally consistent in Columns 3 and 4.73
6 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper has been to understand the judgments people make when they aggregate
others’ ordinal preferences. We find that the overwhelming majority of subjects behave as if they
rely on scoring rules. The Borda and antiplurality rules are the most common alternatives, and a
sizeable majority of subjects uses strictly concave scoring rules, indicating a pronounced preference for
compromise over majoritarian solutions. Plurality rule, Condorcet rules, supermajority, unanimity,
and various runoff rules are relatively rare. The classification’s fit is excellent, and clustering analysis
reveals no major omissions from our list of pre-specified rules. We find systematic and significant
differences in the distributions of rules between the work domain and the political domain, but these
differences are of limited magnitude. Because our classifications are highly predictive of choices out
of sample, including across domains, we infer that ordinal aggregation also entails stable structural
elements. While subjects act as if they attach substantial domain-independent weight to the various
ordinal ranks, we also find strong indications that subjects aggregate ordinal preferences based in part
on inferences about cardinal utility, thus deploying a blend of cardinalism and ordinalism. Supple-
mental experiments show that the distributions of aggregation preferences in the U.S. and Sweden,
countries with divergent political and social traditions, are remarkably similar, and both resemble the
distribution for the student sample used in our main experiment. Even so, there is suggestive evidence
that the use of more concave scoring rules in experimental decisions correlates with a preference for
electing compromise candidates.
Our analysis suggests many potential directions of inquiry for future work. The mere fact that
people rely to some degree on cardinal inferences when presented with ordinal information, and treat
money as a cardinal index when presented with monetary payoffs, does not imply that they are money-
metric welfarists. In the spirit of Roberts (1980), it would be useful to understand which types of
cardinal comparisons people find meaningful, and which (if any) they find arbitrary. Do they ignore
ordinal information when cardinal information is available, or do they use both? Are money-metric
measures of well-being compelling when consequences are non-monetary? Another potential line of
inquiry would investigate the relationships between preferences over rules revealed by choices over
outcomes, preferences over rules revealed by choices over rules (as in Engelmann and Grüner, 2017;
Hoffmann and Renes, 2017; Engelmann et al., 2020), and preferences over rules implied by approval
of axioms (in the spirit of Nielsen and Rehbeck, 2020 and others). It would also be of interest to
investigate how awareness of manipulability influences rule selection.
73Ambuehl et al. (2021b) offer corroborative evidence for external validity: German elected representatives of more
centrist political parties use more concave scoring rules.
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A Additional design and implementation information
A.1 Excluded three-option profiles
Given anonymity and neutrality, our setting of five Stakeholders and three alternatives allows for 42
different preference profiles. The work domain in our experiment uses the 17 profiles that provide
the largest amount of discrimination between our pre-specified rules. Table A.1 lists the remaining
25 profiles that are not included in our experiment. These omitted profiles cannot expand the set of
scoring rules, scoring runoffs, or q-majority rules we can distinguish. In the case of scoring rules and
q-majority rules, this can be shown analytically. For the case of scoring runoff rules, we show this
point using brute-force computer scripts.
Figure A.1 shows that these profiles would also provide little or no additional ability to distinguish
between our pre-specified rules.
Table A.1: Excluded three-alternative profiles.
A A B B B
B C C C C
C B A A A
A C C C C
B A B B B
C B A A A
A C B B B
B A C C C
C B A A A
A C B B B
B A C C A
C B A A C
A C B B B
B A C A A
C B A C C
A A A A A
B B B B B
C C C C C
A A A A A
B B C C C
C C B B B
A A B B B
B B C C C
C C A A A
A A B B B
B B A A A
C C C C C
A A A A A
B C C C C
C B B B B
A A B B B
B C C C A
C B A A C
A A B B B
B C C A A
C B A C C
A C C C C
B A A A B
C B B B A
A C C C C
B A A B B
C B B A A
A B B B B
B C C C C
C A A A A
A B B B B
B C A A A
C A C C C
A B B B B
B A A A A
C C C C C
A C C B B
B B B C C
C A A A A
A C C B B
B B B C A
C A A A C
A B B B B
B C C A A
C A A C C
A C B B B
B B C A A
C A A C C
A A A B B
B C C A A
C B B C C
A C B B B
B B A A A
C A C C C
A A A C C
B C C A A
C B B B B
A B B B B
B C C C A
C A A A C
Notes: Most our pre-specified rules make the same prediction about which option will be chosen for most of the profiles
in this table. Note that for the majority of these profiles, the preference rank distributions of the alternatives are
fully ordered by stochastic dominance, and the option with the lowest (least preferred) rank distribution is statewise
dominated by another option.
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Scoring, s = 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 11 2 2 2 23 2 12 22
Scoring, 0 < s < 1
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 1
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, 1
3
< s < 1
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 1
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, 1
2
< s < 3
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 3
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, 3
5
< s < 2
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 2
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, 2
3
< s < 3
4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 3
4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, 3
4
< s < 4
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 4
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, 4
5
< s < 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Scoring, s = 1 11 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 16 9 16 21
Runoff, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Runoff, 1
3
< s < 1
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Runoff, 1
2
< s < 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Runoff, s = 1 23 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 16 25 25 25 0 25 25 19
Condorcet 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 25 0 12 22
Supermajority 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 16 12 12 12 25 12 0 14
Unanimity 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 22 22 22 19 22 14 0
Notes: This graph plots the set of 22 benevolent rules on both the horizontal and vertical axes. Each cell reports the
number of profiles (out of the 25 profiles omitted from the experiment) for which a given pair of rules differ from each
other. We use the definition that two rules differ on a profile if they select a different subset of options (distance = 1);
otherwise they do not differ on that profile (distance = 0).
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A.2 Distance between rules on profiles used the in political domain
Figure A.2 displays the distance between any pair of our pre-specified rules on the preference profiles
we use for the political domain. Entries of zero off the diagonal indicate that the corresponding pair of
rules cannot be separately identified using either of our methods. Moreover, using incentivized choice
alone, we cannot separately identify any pair of rules that differ from each other on only a single
profile if the set of options chosen by one rule on that profile is a subset of those chosen by the other
rule.























































































































































































































Scoring, s = 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 6 7
Scoring, 0 < s < 1
3 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 6 7
Scoring, s = 1
3 1 1 0 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 1 1 1 6 1 6 6
Scoring, 1
3
< s < 1
2 1 1 1 0 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 1 1 1 7 1 6 7
Scoring, s = 1
2 3 3 3 2 0 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 3 3 3 5 3 6 6
Scoring, 1
2
< s < 3
5 3 3 3 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 7 3 6 7
Scoring, s = 3
5 4 4 4 3 3 1 0 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 4 6 7
Scoring, 3
5
< s < 2
3 4 4 4 3 3 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 7 4 6 7
Scoring, s = 2
3 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 1 0 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 5 6 7
Scoring, 2
3
< s < 3
4 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 5 5 5 7 5 6 7
Scoring, s = 3
4 6 6 6 5 5 3 3 2 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 7
Scoring, 3
4
< s < 4
5 6 6 6 5 5 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 6 6 6 7 6 6 7
Scoring, s = 4
5 7 7 7 6 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 7 7 7 6 7 7 7
Scoring, 4
5
< s < 1 7 7 7 6 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Scoring, s = 1 7 7 7 6 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Runoff, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
3 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 6 7
Runoff, 1
3
< s < 1
2 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 6 7
Runoff, 1
2
< s < 1 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 6 7
Runoff, s = 1 7 7 6 7 5 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 0 7 7 5
Condorcet 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 6 7
Supermajority 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 7 6 0 3
Unanimity 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 7 3 0
Notes: This graph plots the set of 22 benevolent rules on both the horizontal and vertical axes. Each cell reports the
number of profiles (out of the 7 used in the political domain) for which a given pair of rules differ from each other. We
use the definition that two rules differ on a profile if they select a different subset of options (distance = 1); otherwise
they do not differ on that profile (distance = 0).
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A.3 Implementation details
Table A.2 shows session details. The same three research personnel led each session, checked student
IDs and citizenship, and were available for questions over zoom during the entire session.
Table A.2: Session times and participation














B.1 Derivation of the Bayesian posterior
Here, we derive the explicit expression for the Bayesian posteriors, P (R, ε|c), that our Bayesian classi-
fier maximizes. For each preference profile t, a social choice rule R prescribes a subset StR ⊆ {A,B,C}
of admissible options. For each t, the subject makes a choice ct ∈ {A,B,C}. If the individual follows
rule R with error probability ε and behaves according to the assumptions listed in Section 4.2, then the
probability of choosing each alternative is given by the following expressions for X,Y, Z ∈ {A,B,C}
with X, Y , and Z mutually distinct from each other.
P
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Moreover, by the assumption of conditional independence across rounds, the probability of observing







Given the assumption of uniform prior probabilities across rules and error probabilities, we derive the







P (c|R; ε)dε, where NR is the
total number of rules. By Bayes’ rule, the posterior associated with rule R and error probability ε
conditional on the sequence of choices c is thus given by




B.2 Monte Carlo Simulations
We use Monte Carlo simulations to test (i) whether the Bayesian classifier reliably detects the use of
pre-specified rules, and (ii) whether noise introduces bias.
To answer the first question, we simulate a sample of 1,000 subjects. We uniformly randomly assign
each simulated subject to one of the identifiable benevolent rules in each domain. Each simulated
subject follows the assigned rule exactly and randomizes uniformly among all tied options in case of
irresoluteness. We then run the Bayesian classifier on this sample of simulated subjects, both using
all three-option profiles available in the work domain, and using the three-option profiles available
in the political domain. Figure B.3 shows the results. Using the profiles available in the work
domain (Panel A), three features stand out. First, the data are generally tightly centered around the
diagonal. Second, subjects following a massively irresolute rule (supermajority and unanimity) are
frequently confused for following another rule. Yet, even in these cases, the rule generating the choices
receives non-trivial weight. Hence if the classifier assigns zero weight to these two rules, it is unlikely
that any subject actually followed one of these rules. Third, while scoring rules with a parameter
between the boundaries of identifiable intervals are correctly classified in all cases, scoring rules with
a parameter on the interval boundaries are sometimes confused for those with a parameter just above
or just below the interval boundary. The reason is mechanical. In case of a scoring parameter on the
interval boundary (henceforth: a point-identified scoring rule), the set of chosen options is the union
of the options chosen by the neighboring interval-identified scoring rules. By assumption, subjects
uniformly randomize in case of ties. If a point-identified scoring rule is irresolute on two profiles,
and the neighboring interval-identified scoring rules are resolute on those profiles, for instance, there
is a 50% chance that the randomization over the ties happens to coincide exactly with the choices
prescribed by one of the neighboring interval-identified scoring rules. Panel B performs the same
exercise but restricts the available data to the profiles available in the political domain and the set
of rules to the rules identifiable in that domain. Qualitatively, we observe the same results as in the
work domain, with the exception that the (rather irresolute) antiplurality-runoff rule is sometimes
confused with other rules.
To answer the second question, we simulate 4,000 subjects who choose uniformly randomly from
all options in each round. We then run the Bayesian classifier on this sample of simulated subjects,
both using all three-option profiles available in the work domain, and using the three-option profiles
available in the political domain. Figure B.4 shows the resulting distribution of best-fitting types.
Panel A uses the profiles available in the work domain. Unsurprisingly, close to half of simulated
subjects are assigned to a malevolent rule.74 Within the set of benevolent rules, we see that the
least resolute rules, supermajority and unanimity, attract by far the largest fraction of subjects.
The remaining rules all attract similar numbers of subjects, between one and roughly five percent.
74Because our selection of profiles is not random, deviations from 50% are expected.
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Figure B.3: Bayesian classifier if rules are followed exactly
A. Work domain
 Plurality: s = 0
0 < s < 1/3
s = 1/3
1/3 < s < 1/2
 Borda: s = 1/2
1/2 < s < 3/5
3/5 < s < 2/3
s = 2/3
2/3 < s < 3/4
s = 3/4
3/4 < s < 4/5
 Near-antipl.: 4/5 < s ≤ 1
Runoff, 0 ≤ s < 1/3
Runoff, 1/3 < s < 1/2
Runoff, 1/2 < s < 1
































































































































































1/3 < s < 1/2
 Borda: s = 1/2
1/2 < s < 3/5
3/5 < s < 2/3
2/3 < s < 3/4
3/4 < s < 4/5
4/5 < s ≤ 1
Runoff, s = 1
 Supermajority
 Unanimity
































































































Notes: Each of 1,000 simulated subjects is randomly uniformly assigned one identifiable benevolent rule in the respective
domain and follows the rule exactly. In case of ties, simulated subjects randomize uniformly among all tied options.
We run the Bayesian classifier on the simulated data. Fractions of subjects are indicated by the sizes of circles.
7
Notably, neither of the modes we observe in our experimental data, Borda and near-antiplurality,
attract a disproportionate fraction of randomly generated subjects.
Panel B uses the set of profiles available in the political domain. We find that 40.8% of simulated
subjects are classified as malevolent. Among the remainder, we observe the same tendency as in the
work domain to assign randomly generated subjects to the least resolute rules, and no tendency to
disproportionately assign subjects to Borda or near-antiplurality.
Overall, we conclude that our classification results in Section 4.2.2 are not an artifact of classifying
noisy data.
8
Figure B.4: Bayesian classifier on uniformly random noise
A. Work domain





















































































































































































































































a) The category “Consistent with 0 ≤ s < 33” includes scoring rules with 0 ≤ s < 1
3
, any Condorcet extension, and any
scoring runoff rule with s < 1.”
Notes: Each of 4,000 simulated subjects makes uniformly random choices from all three options. We run the Bayesian
classifier on the simulated data. Graphs display the distribution over benevolent rules only.
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C Supplementary results
C.1 Effects of preference displays
Here, we study the influence of the format in which we presented preference profiles on our classification
results. Figure C.5 displays the classification to pre-specified rules separately by display format.
Graphs on the left hand side use incentivized choices only while those on the right hand side make
use of indifference statements.
In each case we see that (i) malevolent and qualified majority rules receive vanishing support,
(ii) runoff rules receive minor support, and (iii) the vast majority of subjects follow a concave scoring
rule. Differences across the graphs mainly concern the modes of Borda and near-antiplurality. Relying
on incentivized data alone, both of these rules emerge as the modal choices in each display version.
While Borda is the more pronounced mode in display versions 1 and 3, near-antiplurality is the
more pronounced mode in display version 2. This same pattern emerges to a larger extent if we
incorporate indifference data for classification. Overall we conclude that our main results are robust
to the preference display used, except that we cannot reliably distinguish whether Borda or near-
antiplurality is the more pronounced mode.
10
Figure C.5: Best fitting pre-specified rules, work domain, by display
Display 1 (options in cells)




















































































































































































































































































































































Display 2 (Stakeholders in cells)




















































































































































































































































































































































Display 3 (ranks in cells)




















































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Displays 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
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C.2 Classifications by fit
Panel A of Figure C.6 displays the results of our classification based on incentivized choice separately
for subjects whose choices are perfectly consistent with their best-fitting rule and those whose choices
deviate on at least one preference profile from their best-fitting rule.
Figure C.6: Best fitting pre-specified rules, by perfect fit


































































































































































































































































Notes: Results of the classification based on incentivized data alone. Panel A shows the subset of subjects whose choices
are a perfect fit to the best-fitting rule. Panel B shows the subset of subjects who fit the best-fitting rule imperfectly.
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C.3 Last-place aversion
Does the the concave aggregation we document in section 4.2 simply represent linear aggregation
with a discount for receiving one’s least-preferred alternative (last-place aversion; formalized as using
scoring vectors that assign score k−1K−1 to any option ranked k ≥ 2, but score −d < 0 to the option
ranked last in the case of K alternatives), or does it reflect globally concave aggregation in the sense
that subjects’ choices are described by score vectors that are strictly concave across all ranks (for





to the option ranked k in
the case of K alternatives)? Choices in the runoff-separating profiles of Table 3 show that globally
concave aggregation plays a substantial role. In these profiles, the choice of option A is consistent
with a scoring rule with s ≤ 0.5 whereas the choice of B or C is consistent with s ∈ [ 12 ,
2
3 ] and
s ∈ [ 23 , 1], respectively, where s = (
1
2 )
γ . Importantly, in these profiles, option B is ranked last by
one individual, and option A is ranked last by two individuals. In the three-option profiles 3 and 4,
64% of subjects choose the option consistent with a weakly concave scoring rule. If last-place aversion
explains this choice pattern, then, in the four-option profiles 22 and 23, we should observe that at
least 64% of subjects avoid the last-place-generating options (A or B). In contrast, the fraction of
subjects selecting either option A or option B is given by 64.2% and 81.7% for the first and second
runoff-separating profiles, respectively. Hence, last-place aversion cannot be the sole reason for the
choice patterns we observe in the three-option profiles.
13
D General population samples: Supplementary information
D.1 Implementation details
Instructions are abridged versions from the laboratory experiment, but include the detailed presen-
tation of the preference display. We only use versions 1 and 2 of presenting preference profiles (see
Figures 3 and 4, respectively), since version 3 is often perceived as less intuitive.
A native speaker of Swedish at a commercial translation agency translated the survey into Swedish.
We aimed for 1000 respondents in each country. We began sampling with Dynata until no further
subjects could be recruited. We then continued sampling the same survey with Lucid until no fur-
ther subjects could be recruited (potential repeat participants were automatically filtered out by the
Qualtrics survey). We retain subjects who participated through Dynata if they correctly answered the
comprehension check about the preference display. For subjects recruited through Lucid we added a
filter such that subjects could complete the survey only if they correctly answered these comprehen-
sion check questions. Because of these requirements, which are more stringent than typical for the
subject population, we managed to obtain 712 subjects in Sweden and a comparable 805 subjects in
the US. We recruited all Stakeholders with pollfish.
D.2 Respondent summary statistics
Table D.3 presents the distribution of the demographic characteristics of the general population sam-
ples.
14





















Other European background 0.124
Other 0.098
Political party preference
Republican or other right-learning party 0.477
Democrat or other left-learning party 0.523
Left Party 0.149






Primary school 0.000 0.052
Some high school 0.005 0.058
High school or GED 0.145 0.266
Some college 0.194 0.159
Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree 0.419 0.412
Master’s degree 0.189 0.030
Doctoral degree 0.048 0.024
Income bracket
< USD 50k, < SEK 500k 0.420 0.779
between USD 50k and 100k or SEK 500k and 1,000k 0.349 0.208





















Subjects see each of the following statements, and complete the re-
quested action before the next statement is shown.
(i) You can drag and drop each worker to a di↵erent position. Please
give this a try by dragging a worker to a di↵erent location.
(ii) Underneath each stick figure representing the worker, you will
see a button labeled ”Hide”. If you click it, that worker’s prefer-
ences will be hidden. If you click it a second time, that worker’s
preferences will be displayed again. Please hide, then show, one
of the workers.
(iii) At the bottom of the figure, you see two rows of buttons. Buttons
in the first row allow you to highlight an assignment. If you click
the button a second time, the highlighting will be switched o↵.
Please give this a try.
(iv) Buttons in the second row allow you to hide an assignments. If
you click such a button a second time, the assignment will be
displayed again. Please hide, then show one of the assignments.
(v) Finally, on top of the figure, you see a button labelled “shu✏e”.
That button will shu✏e the order of the workers. Please click it.















The screenshot on the right displays the text that is shown only if the subject clicks the button.
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On the same page, the subject also answers the following two questions:
• How much is this citizen willing to pay to trigger or prevent a donation of Fr. 30 to
the party she ranks in the middle (neither most nor least preferred), out of the three?
• How much is this citizen willing to pay to trigger or prevent a donation of Fr. 30 to
the party she ranks on the bottom (least preferred), out of the three?
The subject answers the same three questions for another (real) four Swiss citizens, all with
common Swiss first names. A random half of subjects see the above three questions in reverse
order, i.e. starting with the citizen’s bottom preference.
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On the same page, the subject answers the same question for each of the remaining four parties (parties
















Subjects see each of the following statements, and complete the requested action before
the next statement is shown.
(i) You can drag and drop each charity to a di↵erent position. Please give this a try
by dragging one charity to a di↵erent location.
(ii) On each bar, just above the stick figures representing the citizens, you see a button
labeled ‘hide.’ If you click it, the citizen’s preferences about that charity will be
hidden. If you click it again, they will be shown again. Please hide, then show,
citizen’s preferences about one of the charities.
(iii) If you hide one of the charities, only two charities remain. The picture then places
the citizens into the cells according to which of the two charities they find better.
The picture is still showing the same preference information by the same citizens!
To see this, please again hide, then show, one of the charities.
(iv) At the bottom of the figure, you see two rows of buttons. Buttons in the top row let
you hide and show individual citizens. Please hide, then show, one of the citizens.
(v) At the bottom of the figure, you see two rows of buttons. Buttons in the top row let
you hide and show individual citizens. Please hide, then show, one of the citizens.
(vi) Buttons in the bottom row let you highlight individual citizens. Please highlight,
then un-highlight one of the citizens.
(vii) Finally, at the top of the picture you see a button labeled ‘Shu✏e charities.’ That
button will shu✏e the order in which the charities are displayed. Please click it.


















E.4 Elicitation of Swiss citizen Stakeholder preferences
 English translation      Original 
 
Q1. Good day! Are you a citizen 
Of Switzerland? [Yes / No] 
 
Q2. What is your general political 
attitude? [Clearly right, moderately 
right, center, moderately left 
clearly left] 
 
Q3. This study is about a donation 
of SFr. 30 to one of the five largest  
Swiss political parties (measured by 
percentage of seats in the National  
Council). Your answer, as well as the  
answer of five other study participants 
will determine which party receives 
the donation. 
 
Q4. With a one in forty chance, your  
answer will completely determine 
which party receives the donation.  
With the remaining probability, your 
answer will partly determine the  
recipient.  
 
Q5. Please indicate which party you 
would like the most to receive the  
donation, and which the least.  
(Choose “1” for “the most” and “2” 
for “the least.”) The order of parties 
below is random. The computer has 
randomly selected two parties. If 
your own answer determines the  
recipient, the party (of the two) that 
you prefer more will receive the  
donation.  
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